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In their seminal paper, Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) showed mathematically that the 
market value of the firm is invariant to the firm’s leverage; different packaging of contractual 
claims on the firm’s asset returns does not impact the total market value of the firm’s debt and 
equity.  The Modigliani and Miller – henceforth MM – value-invariance theorem suggests that 
the law of one price prevails for assets of the same “risk class”.  The core of the theorem is an 
arbitrage proof: If two assets, one leveraged and one unleveraged, represent claims on the same 
cash flow, any arising market discrepancies are arbitraged away.  But due to its assumption of 
perfect capital markets and the no-limits-to-arbitrage condition (requiring perfect positive 
correlation of asset returns, no fees on the usage of leverage, etc.), the MM theorem has not been 
tested in a satisfactory manner on real-world market data.  Thus, its empirical significance has 
been unclear.1   
Nevertheless, such a test is feasible in the laboratory, and providing an empirical test of 
the MM theorem is a primary purpose of this laboratory study.  Since perfect return-correlation is 
rare in naturally-occurring equities, we also check how limits to arbitrage affect the empirical 
validity of the MM theorem with regards to cross-asset pricing.  In particular, we address the 
question of whether a perfect positive correlation between asset returns is necessary for the 
empirical validity of value invariance or if the same expected (rather than identical) future return 
is sufficient, as suggested for our setting by the capital asset pricing model.  Our data indeed 
suggest that perfect correlation is necessary for the law of one price to prevail.   
                                                 
1 The perfect-capital-markets assumption requires, among other things, that no taxes and transaction fees are levied, 
and that the same interest rate applies for everyone.  Lamont and Thaler (2003) present several real-world examples 
where the law of one price is violated.  They argue that these violations result from limits to arbitrage.  There was an 
early objection concerning the applicability of value invariance in relation to the variation of payout policy.  
Modigliani and Miller (1959) replied to this objection by stating that the dividend policy is irrelevant for the value of 
the company.  However, it is now widely-accepted that dividends impact empirical valuations (for a recent 
discussion of the dividend puzzle, see DeAngelo and DeAngelo 2006).  The dividend-irrelevance theorem was thus 
empirically rejected and is considered as being of theoretical interest only.  Still, the value-invariance theorem and 
its proof remain widely-accepted in the profession even without an empirical test.   
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Our main design adapts the experimental asset-markets research of Smith, Suchanek and 
Williams (1988), featuring multi-period cash flows, zero interest rates, and a repetition of 
markets with experienced subjects.2  However, in contrast to the standard, single-asset market 
approach of Smith et al. and in line with MM, we have simultaneous trading taking place in two 
shares of the same “equivalence class”.  These twin shares, which we call the L-shares and the 
U-shares, are claims on the same underlying uncertain future cash flows.  In one treatment the 
returns of the L-share and the U-share are perfectly correlated and so any price discrepancies that 
might arise can be arbitraged away at no risk; in a second treatment, where returns of the L-share 
and the U-share are uncorrelated, we study the impact of limits to arbitrage.  In both cases, the 
expected stream to shareholders of L-shares and U-shares differs by a constant amount, i.e., the 
synthetic value of debt as we discuss below, so the L-share and the U-share represent accounting 
“leveraged” and “unleveraged” equity streams.   
By comparing the market prices of shares, we thus present a very simple test of the MM 
theorem.3  At any point in time when the price deviates from parity, in other words if the 
difference between the L-share and the U-share is not the same as the synthetic debt value, each 
market participant can exploit the price discrepancy.  Since short-selling and borrowing is 
costless a trader can make a riskless arbitrage gain by going short the expensive share and long 
the inexpensive share.  Exploited pricing discrepancies thereby undo the divergence of market 
values.   
                                                 
2 See Palan (2013) for a recent literature survey.  The literature is mainly concerned with the measuring of 
mispricing in the single-asset market.  The conclusion is that confusion of subjects and speculation are the main 
sources of the price deviations from fundamentals in the laboratory (e.g., Smith et al.  1988, Lei, Noussair and Plott 
2001, Kirchler, Huber and Stoeckl 2012).  Mispricing occurs in the single asset market, and also when assets are 
simultaneously traded in two markets (Ackert et al.  2009, Chan, Lei and Veseley 2013).  Smith and Porter (1995), 
Noussair and Tucker (2006) and Noussair et al. (2016) report reduced mispricing when a futures market enables 
subjects to arbitrage price discrepancies of underlying asset and futures contract.   
3 We show in Section 3 how our design maps into the MM theorem. 
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Our data provide support for the MM theorem since average prices are close to parity, 
even though some price discrepancies and deviations from the risk-neutral value persist 
throughout the experiment.  In our perfect-correlation treatment, we observe that perfect 
correlation is essential for value indifference as we control for variations in correlation; in our 
control no-correlation treatment, we consider independent draws of dividends of the two 
simultaneously traded shares.  Here, L-shares and U-shares have the same expected dividend and 
idiosyncratic risk as in the perfect-correlation treatment, but an asset swap has risk.   
We find a clear treatment effect: We observe a higher level of price discrepancies in the 
no-correlation treatment.  With perfect correlation our measures of cross-asset price discrepancy, 
relative frequency of discrepant limit orders, and deviation from fundamental dividend value 
indicate smaller deviations from the theoretical benchmarks than in the no-correlation treatment.4  
The market corrects relative mispricing with perfectly-correlated returns but not as well with 
independent asset returns.   
Hence, although potential price discrepancies never disappear in absolute quantitative 
terms for the perfect-correlation treatment, our data provide rather strong qualitative support for 
the equilibrium through the comparison of our treatments.  That said, as with evidence observed 
with experienced subjects in single-asset market studies (e.g., Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair 2007; 
Dufwenberg, Lindqvist, and Moore 2005), the price deviation from fundamental dividend values 
declines in consecutive markets in both treatments.  The movement towards the theoretical 
benchmarks, nonetheless, seems to be more rapid in the perfect-correlation treatment than in the 
no-correlation treatment, both in decline of price discrepancies and in deviation from 
                                                 
4 In line with the studies that apply a zero discount rate in the Smith et al.  (1988) experimental framework, we 
define the fundamental dividend value by the sum of discounted expected future dividends.   
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fundamental dividend value.  Nevertheless, some potential price discrepancies persist in both 
treatments, even with experienced subjects. 
We consider the impact of traders’ acuity, as measured by the cognitive reflection task 
(CRT; Frederick, 2005), on the level of price discrepancy; the literature suggests that smart 
traders search and eliminate price discrepancies.5  Our measure correlates with the reduction in 
price discrepancy on the overall sample.  While there are some price discrepancies in markets 
with higher trader aptitude, these are substantially less common and smaller.  However, we find 
no evidence of subjects specializing in arbitrage, so we conclude that existing discrepancies are 
dissolved by the equilibration dynamics of the market rather than by skilled individual traders.  
Even so, low trader aptitude leads to pricing discrepancies in the no-correlation treatment.   
Overall, we provide evidence regarding how limits to arbitrage (such as our no-
correlation treatment) impact value invariance.  One main contribution is that we are able to 
empirically validate value invariance under perfect correlation.  A second main contribution is 
the observation of a treatment effect, since price discrepancies in the market increase 
substantially when one moves from perfect positive correlation to zero correlation.  The 
deviations appear to be driven by relative overvaluation of the U-share.  In the perfect-
correlation treatment these are evened out, but in the no-correlation treatment they prevail in 
markets with overall low trader aptitude.  Finally, we observe that high trader acuity significantly 
reduces the price discrepancy in the market and shares trade closer to fundamental dividend 
value. 
We also conduct additional treatments to attempt to understand the patterns that we 
observe in the initial perfect-correlation and no-correlation treatments.  In one treatment, we 
                                                 
5 See the discussions in Shleifer (2000) and Lamont and Thaler (2003). 
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specifically investigate 10-period markets with only a single asset present.  We find no 
systematic mispricing in this treatment.   In a final treatment, we have two assets traded in a 
single period.  Here again we do not find significant differences from parity pricing.  Earlier 
experimental results have shown that in simple settings, double-auction market prices easily 
average around the competitive-equilibrium prediction.6  Thus, we have proposed a more 
extreme test of MM in the context of long-lived assets and declining dividend value, which is 
known for being cognitively-demanding.  Thus, we find differential behavior in the perfect-
correlation treatment versus the no-correlation treatment. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we explain the 
experimental design.  In section 3 we discuss the MM theorem in light of our design, and in 
Section 4 we present our measures of price discrepancies and hypotheses.  Our experimental 
results are presented in Section 5.  We present robustness tests with data from the additional 
treatments in section 6 and we conclude the paper in Section 7. 
.    
 
1. Literature Review and Experimental Design 
1.A. Literature review 
Our study contributes to the modest experimental literature that tries to evaluate the 
market’s ability to reduce or eliminate arbitrage opportunities.7  The observation of persistence in 
price discrepancies confirms earlier empirical results.  O’Brien and Srivastava (1993) replicate 
                                                 
6 In the classic study of Vernon Smith (1962), market equilibrium dynamics were strong in small markets.  Gode and 
Sunder (1993) found strong equilibrium dynamics even in simulations with randomized algorithms (“zero 
intelligence traders”). 
7 See the surveys in Cadsby and Maynes (1998), and Sunder (1995). 
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portfolios of options, stocks and cash in a multiple-asset experimental market with two stages 
and information asymmetries.  The authors report that if the information asymmetry cannot be 
resolved, price discrepancies frequently persist.   
Oliven and Rietz (2004) investigate the data of the 1992 Iowa presidential election 
market (IEM), a large-scale experiment conducted for several months on the Internet.  Arbitrage 
opportunities in this market were quite easy to spot; if the value of the market portfolio deviated 
from the issue price, any trader could make an arbitrage gain by selling or buying at said issue 
price.  Oliven and Rietz report a substantial number of price discrepancies, but find that these 
were quickly driven out.  Rietz (2005) reports on a laboratory prediction-market experiment with 
state-contingent claims.  Similarly to the IEM, arbitrage opportunities were easily spotted, but 
trading was over 100 minutes rather than 100 days.  Rietz concludes that this market is prone to 
violate the no-arbitrage requirement.  However, if (as in one treatment) the experimenter 
automatically eliminates each price discrepancy, this automatic arbitrageur was involved in most 
trades in the experiment.  Abbink and Rockenbach (2006) report that, even after hours of 
experience, both students and professional traders left arbitrage opportunities unexploited in an 
individual investment-allocation task of cash to options, bonds and stock.   
To the best of our knowledge, Levati, Qiu, and Mahagaonkar (2012) conduct the only other 
experimental study to test the MM theorem.  Their design forecloses any arbitrage possibility or 
(homemade) leveraging and unleveraging.8  Levati et al. examine evaluations for eight 
independent lotteries with varying degree of risks in a sequence of experimental single-asset call 
auction markets, where the risks represent different levels of company leverage.  In contrast to 
our perfect-correlation treatment, and similar to our results obtained in the no-correlation 
                                                 
8 Stiglitz (1969) proves MM value invariance within a general equilibrium approach, without explicit arbitrage 
assumptions.   
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treatment, the market data in Levati et al. show no support for value invariance.  The authors 
acknowledge the foreclosure of any arbitrage possibility as a potential reason for this result. 
 
1.B. Experimental design 
In our experiment, subjects could buy and sell multi-period-lived assets in continuous 
double-auction markets.  The assets involved claims to a stochastic dividend stream over a 
lifespan of ten periods,  = 10, after which these assets had no further value.  The instructions 
can be found in the Online Appendix. 
Trading occurred in two asset classes named L-shares and U-shares.9  We follow design 
4 from Smith et al.  (1988), where the dividend paid on an L-share was independently drawn {0, 
8, 28 or 60 cents} with equal probability at the end of every period, so that the expected 
dividends per period were 24 cents on L-shares.  The possible dividends paid on the U-share 
were 24 cents higher, and so the expected dividends per share were 48 cents on U-shares.  The 
interest rate was zero and thus the discounted sum of expected dividends conventionally referred 
to as fundamental dividend value of L-shares and U-shares were initially 240 and 480 cents and 
decreases by 24 and 48 cents per period (see Table 1).  After the last dividend payment, all 
shares were worthless and the final cash balance was recorded.    
Our treatment variation between subjects is the correlation (ρLU) between the dividends 
on L-shares and U-shares.  In the perfect-correlation treatment, (ρLU = 1), the U-share paid 
exactly 24 cents more in each period than does the L-share.  In the no-correlation treatment, (ρLU 
= 0), the dividend on the U-share was independently drawn {24, 32, 52, 84 cents} with equal 
probability.   
                                                 
9 In the experiment we said “A-share” and “B-share” instead of L-share and U-share. 
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Table 1. Initial individual endowments and moments 
The first column shows the individual initial unit endowments with shares and cash. The second 
and third columns show first and second moments of dividend value distributions; ‡expected 
dividend value and total variance are per unit and period, t ≤ T = 10. The initial total variance is 
5360 for each share; the initial expected payoffs of the L-share and the U-share are 240 and 480. 
Variances, expected dividend values decrease linearly over time. 
 
initial unit 
endowment 
Expected dividend 
value/unit‡ 
Initial total 
variance/unit‡ 
    
L-shares 2 24 (T - t + 1) 536 (T - t + 1) 
U-shares 2 48 (T - t + 1) 536 (T - t + 1) 
Cash units 1200 1 - 
 
 
 Each market participant could electronically submit an unlimited number of bids and asks 
in the two simultaneous markets.  Submitted bids and asks were publicly visible and could not be 
cancelled.  The best outstanding bid and ask were available for immediate sale and purchase 
through confirmation by the other market participants.  Upon a transaction, all bids of the buyer 
and all offers of the seller were cancelled in both markets and the price was publicly recorded.  
However, the buyer may also have placed offers to sell and the seller may have placed bids to 
buy; any such offers and bids remained in the market.  So, any arbitrageur who wanted to exploit 
a price discrepancy could immediately buy low and sell high by pressing the buttons.   
Market participants were initially endowed with two L-shares and two U-shares, and 
1200 cents cash (see Table 1).  Traders were able to borrow up to 2400 cents for the purchase of 
assets and could short-sell up to four L-shares and up to four U-shares without any margin 
requirements.10  The trading flow was unaffected (i.e., there was no message indicating a short 
                                                 
10 Subjects would not exhaust their borrowing capacity for strategic reasons.  Only 0.1 percent of subjects’ end-of-
period records indicate a cash balance below -2,200.  All these records correspond to individual bankruptcies.  
Bankruptcy rarely occurred and never occurred in the last two rounds of the experiment.   
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sale rather than a long sale) by short sales and borrowings, which were displayed as negative 
numbers.11  Each subject had thus a wide scope for financial decision-making.   
In order to reduce confusion and consequential pricing discrepancies, subjects were 
reminded on screen about the expected future dividends and the sum of expected dividends for 
the remaining periods.  Dividends, prices (open, low, high, closing and average), number of 
transactions, and portfolio compositions in each past period were recorded in tables.  Since we 
were interested in the effects of experience, an experimental session involved four consecutive 
markets, each designed for nine subjects.  The period length in the first market was 180 seconds, 
and was 90 seconds in the subsequent markets.12  One of the four markets was chosen (with 
equal probability) for payment at the end of the session.  A subject determined the payoff-
decisive market by a die roll.  Subjects received their final cash balance in the payoff-decisive 
market plus the payoff from two pre-market tasks (further detailed below) and a show-up fee of 
$15 in an envelope at their cabin.  In case of a negative cash balance, the subject’s show-up fee 
would be correspondingly reduced, but by not more than $5.   
Subjects were recruited from a pool of economics and science students at UCSB via 
ORSEE (Greiner 2004).  Each person drew a number from a tray upon arriving at the laboratory.  
This number indicated one’s cabin number.  Before the instructions were read for the trading 
markets, subjects engaged in two pre-market tasks to reveal to us their relevant personal traits.  
Information on payoffs from these tasks was only communicated at the end of the session.  The 
first task was an investment game to assess the subjects’ degree of risk aversion (Charness and 
                                                 
11 Subjects would typically not exhaust their short-sale capacities for strategic reasons.  Overall, 8% of subjects’ 
end-of-period records indicate negative share-holdings.  The short-sale limit of -4 shares was reached in 2% of 
records of which more than 50% correspond to individual bankruptcies.   
12 We allowed more time in the first market for people to get accustomed to the decisions.  There is no evidence 
(including questionnaire reports) that subjects were short of time in the shorter intervals. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3428299 
 
 
11
Gneezy, 2010).  They chose an amount 0 ≤ 	 ≤ $10 to allocate to a risky asset that paid with 
equal probability 0 or 2.5 	 and to a safe asset $10 − 	 ≥ 0, to be paid out with certainty.  One 
of the nine participants in the asset market would receive the payoff from the first experiment.  
The second task was the CRT, where the three questions were asked in a random order.13  
Subjects had 90 seconds to answer the questions and were rewarded with $1 per correct answer.   
As part of the instructions, subjects had to successfully complete four practice exercises: 
a dividend questionnaire, a trading round, a forecasting reward questionnaire,14 and a second 
trading round.  After the four markets, subjects were debriefed in a questionnaire on personal 
details.  The experiment was computerized with the software ztree (Fischbacher 2007).  Written 
instructions were distributed, and verbal instructions were played from a recording.   
After conducting these two initial treatments, we conducted two additional treatments to 
further investigate patterns found in the first treatments.  These consisted of 10-period asset 
markets with a single asset and one-period asset markets with two assets.  The design and results 
can be found in Section 6. 
 
 
                                                 
13 The questions were: (1) A hat and a suit cost $110.  The suit costs $100 more than the hat.  How much does the 
hat cost? (2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 
widgets? (3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads.  Every day the patch doubles in size.  If it takes 48 days for the 
patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of it?  
14 Prior to each period, subjects made predictions about the average prices at which the assets would be transacted 
during the period.  By asking to reflect and predict market outcomes prior to the period we aimed at deeply engaging 
subjects in the experiment.  Similar to the design in Haruvy et al. (2007), subjects initially submitted a forecast of 
the average price of each asset for each future period.  In our design, however, subjects updated only their price 
forecasts of the current period prior to subsequent market openings.  Subjects received salient rewards for accurate 
forecasts; the mean percentage deviation of the forecast from the realized average price was subtracted from one and 
the remainder is multiplied by $6.  The deviation in any period is capped at 100%.  Periods without transactions did 
not count in the determination of the payoff, in either the numerator or the denominator.  Subjects were rewarded 
either for the accuracy of initial forecasts or for the accuracy of updated forecasts, with equal probability.  The 
decision was made by computerized random draw after the last market period.  The reward from forecasting was 
included in the subject’s final cash balance. 
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2. Modigliani-Miller invariance theorem 
In this section we discuss the invariance theorem of Modigliani and Miller (1958), hereafter MM, 
in light of our experimental design, in particular, the perfect-correlation treatment.15  We begin 
by restating the MM invariance theorem (without taxes) and sketching the proof (Modigliani and 
Miller 1958, p. 268f). 
“[Invariance theorem]:  Consider any company  and let 	 stand for the  ... expected 
profit before deducting interest.  Denote by   the … value of the debts of the company; 
by   the market value of … common shares; and by  ≡  +  the market value of all 
securities....  Then … we must have in equilibrium:  
 ≡  +  = 	/, for any firm j in class k.” (1)        
 
The expected cash flows are discounted by the market-required return on assets (), which is 
determined by the equivalence class k of the company’s assets and the risk-attitude of the market.  
The MM invariance theorem states that the total market value of the firm is invariant to its 
capital structure.  It implies that identical cash flows are priced the same in equilibrium.16 
To prove the implication of the invariance theorem, MM compare two companies with 
the same total cash-flow 	 over the infinite horizon.  The first company U is entirely equity 
financed (so that at the end of the period the equity holders get the entire return X).  The other 
company L is leveraged, with debt of face value D, so that at the end of the period, debt-holders 
                                                 
15 Comments from Bruno Biais, Peter Bossaerts and an associate editor helped us to significantly improve this 
section. 
16 Since in the MM world without taxes and riskless debt the assets are the same for the unleveraged (U) and the 
leveraged (L) firm, the required expected total return on assets must be the same independently of the company’s 
debt ratio, (see MM 1958 equation (4), p. 268); 

 =

 =

 !" =

 = .   
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get rD, and equity holders get X - rD.  MM then show by arbitrage that one must have: VU = SU 
= SL + D = VL (where SU and SL are the market values of equity of the two companies, and VU 
and VL are the total values of the unleveraged and the leveraged companies).  Starting on page 
269, MM analyze the arbitrage trade when the total market value of company L is larger than that 
of company U, i.e. VL = SL + D > VU.  To take advantage of this situation, the arbitrageur sells 
shares in the leveraged company, borrows, and buys shares in the unleveraged company.  So he 
is long a portfolio whose value is that of the unleveraged company minus debt service, and he is 
short the equity of the leveraged company.  The former is a synthetic version of the latter.  Since 
cash flows on both portfolios are the same the investor is not exposed to risk.  But, at the 
inception of the position, the portfolio purchased is cheaper than the portfolio sold.  Hence, there 
is an arbitrage profit.  Since arbitrage cannot exist in equilibrium, the proof concludes. 
How does our experimental setting map into this?  We consider two stocks L and U.  The 
dividend on the U-share is 24, 32, 52 or 84 with equal probability.  The dividend on the L-share 
is 24 lower than that of the U-share (in each state).  To map this into MM, assume the two 
companies hold the same real asset.  The payoff generated by that real asset is 24, 32, 52 or 84 
with equal probability.  The U-share can be thought of as the equity share of the unleveraged 
firm, getting the entire payoff.  And the L-share can be thought of as the equity share in the 
leveraged company, holding the same asset, but having issued debt with value 24 cents (D in 
MM), so that its shares get the cash flow minus 24.  The MM arbitrage argument states that the 
market value of the unleveraged company (#, the price of the U-share) must be equal to the 
value of the leveraged company, which is the market value of equity ($, the price of the L-
share) plus the value of the debt (D).  
VU = SU = SL + D = VL (2)        
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An arbitrage opportunity similar to that analyzed on page 269 of MM is one in which, 
infringing on equation (2), the total market value of the leveraged firm is larger than that of the 
unleveraged firm, as SL + D > SU.  The immediate, riskless gain from going long the unleveraged 
U-share and short the leveraged L-share equals the difference between the two, ($ +  − # >
0).  This arbitrage gain results due to the fact that there are no margin or repurchase requirements 
in our experiment, all shares are cancelled at maturity T, and debt (D) is a synthetic debt stream 
without real impact.17  In equilibrium arbitrage cannot exist.  The prices of U-share and L-share 
must therefore differ exactly by the value of debt.  
Modigliani and Miller (1958) discuss expected future streams and suggest one discount 
rate for same risks, but the proof of the theorem requires identical future streams.  One key 
research question that we raise in our experimental control treatment (with zero correlation) is 
whether empirical validation of the invariance theorem actually requires identical asset returns.18  
Our research question is two-fold: 
i) Are the prices of two portfolios equal when they have perfectly-correlated payoffs 
(modulo a shift) and short sales and borrowing are unconstrained? 
ii) Are the prices of two portfolios equal when their payoffs are uncorrelated but with the 
same distribution (modulo a shift) and short sales and borrowing are unconstrained? 
                                                 
17 Debt is a pure accounting stream not noted by experimental subjects.  Trading costs and interest rates are zero and 
the shares need not be repurchased but are simply cash at the end of the market sequence.  The accounting exercise 
is easy because cash-financing and debt-financing have the same consequences in the experiment. 
18 MM (1958, p.  266) assume identical risk classes “such that the return on the shares … in any given class is 
proportional to (and hence perfectly correlated with) the return on the shares ...  in the same class...” These 
conditions are satisfied in our perfect-correlation treatment.  Conditions are similar in our no-correlation treatment, 
since expected returns of assets are the same as in the perfect-correlation treatment.  However, returns are 
independent in the no-correlation treatment so that, in the strict sense of the definition, L-shares and U-shares are not 
in the identical risk class.  Our experimental test checks if the strict implementation of the definition is critical for 
achieving empirical support for value invariance.  In the laboratory it is not so clear if notable differences can be 
detected.  On one hand, earlier research has suggested that human behavior may disregard correlations between asset 
returns (e.g, Kroll, Levy and Rapoport 1988).  On the other hand, our setting favors pricing at expected dividend 
value, since subjects are informed about the fundamental dividend values in the instructions thereby possibly 
reducing confusion of subjects and mispricing of assets (e.g., Kirchler et al. 2012).   
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Question i) is the direct test of the MM (1958) theorem.  For question ii), the relevant 
theoretical result is that (in perfect markets) two portfolios with the same payoffs should have the 
same equilibrium price (and this holds irrespective of utility functions).  This argument can be 
motivated through the capital asset-pricing model as described in the experimental finance 
literature (Asparouhova, Bossaerts, Plott 2003; Bossaerts, Plott, Zame 2007).   
&#'$' (
∗ =  &*#'*$' ( − + ,
-#'. /$#-$'-#'/$#-$'-#' -$'. 0 &
1̅#1̅$ ( 
(3)        
This formula, here adapted to two risky assets, takes account of market supply and demand.  The 
equilibrium price is determined by the mean holdings of the market portfolio 1̅ of risky assets (as 
indicated in Table 1), the expected dividend payoffs of risky assets (*', j = U, L), the (harmonic 
mean) risk aversion of the market (K), and the covariance matrix.  With equal supplies, (i.e., 
1̅# = 1̅$), equal payoff variances of L-shares and U-shares, (i.e., -$. = -#.), and zero correlation, 
(/$# = 0), the equilibrium-price difference equals the difference of the expected dividend 
payoffs, (i.e., #'∗ − $'∗ = *#' − *$', 3 =  1, . . , ).19  Hence, for both treatments theoretical 
arguments are available to expect parity pricing in the market.  We consider a perfect (no-fee) 
capital-market setting and ask whether actual human beings conform to the predictions of theory.   
Riskless exploitation of price discrepancies is impossible where payoffs are only 
identically distributed rather than perfectly correlated.  So in this case smart traders may require 
a risk premium to keep relative prices in balance, thereby allowing for a larger deviation from 
                                                 
19 Note in equation (2), the same is true for perfect correlation, ( = *# − *$).  The formula generally holds if the 
agent buys for keeps (not speculatively), but it does not generally extend to other utility functions (unless payoffs are 
Gaussian); variance is not the right measure of risk in general.  However, the CAPM formula provides a valid first-
order approximation to prices if total risk is small (see the proof in Judd and Guu 2001). 
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parity pricing.20  Well-documented evidence from real-world markets shows that relative 
mispricing of twin shares can occur over an extended horizon when there are limits to arbitrage 
(e.g., Froot and Dabora 1999).  Shleifer (2000) suggested that in pricing of twin shares “noise 
trader risk” can result in limits to arbitrage.  The risk exists that discrepancies may widen instead 
of narrow when traders follow price trends that move away from equilibrium.   
 
 
3. Measures and hypotheses 
3.A. Measures 
We now formulate our measures and testable hypotheses.  Let, as above, *#' and *$'denote the 
fundamental dividend values, and let #' and $' denote the share prices of the U-share and the 
L-share in period 3, respectively.  We measure the relative difference from parity pricing of the 
U-share and the L-share as follows.   
∆'= #'$' + ' − 1 =
6#' − $'7 − 6*#' − *$'7$' + 6*#' − *$'7  
(4)        
The first ratio in (4) relates the value of the “unleveraged” company U to the value of the 
“leveraged” company L, where the difference between fundamental dividend values in the 
second denominator stands for the synthetic value of debt (' = *#' − *$').  The right-hand side 
in (4) is obtained by replacing the synthetic debt value.  The invariance theorem requires pricing 
at parity, ∆'= 0 (see Hypothesis 1).  Thus, market values shall differ by as much as but not more 
than fundamentals.  In our data analyses, market value is the average market price of the period.   
                                                 
20 We note that markets are incomplete in our no-correlation treatment, since a self-financing replicating portfolio 
cannot be formed.  Therefore, in incomplete markets (riskless) arbitrage is generally impossible.  However, if 
market prices confirmed fundamentals or if the deviations from fundamentals were the same in both of our markets, 
no cross-asset price discrepancy would arise and the law of one price would still obtain.   
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We define the measure cross-asset price discrepancy (PD) as follows, where  = 10 is 
the number of market periods.   
8 = 1 9|∆'|'
 
(5)        
The PD-value is the average absolute percentage deviation from parity pricing during the course 
of a market.  Price discrepancy indicates potential gains by selling high and buying low based on 
average prices.  The value is usually positive even if the average difference from parity pricing is 
zero.  The PD-value is zero if L-share and U-share prices are equal to fundamental dividend 
values, or if prices deviate by the same amount from the fundamental dividend values.   
 Even with zero PD-value, prices can deviate from fundamental value.  To measure price 
deviations from fundamentals we define the relative absolute deviation from fundamentals (DF).  
The DF-value here measures the expected excess return of buying and selling at prices off the 
known fundamental dividend value (j = 1, 2 indicates L-shares and U-shares, J = 2).   
 
*' = ;'*' − 1; 
* = 1< 9 9 *'
=
'>?
@
>?
 
(6) 
The DF-value represents expected gains by purchasing one share if the price is below or 
selling one share if the price is above the fundamental dividend value.  It compares the price to 
the predicted value under the equilibrium hypothesis, and the PD compares the price to the 
predicted value under the no-discrepancy hypothesis.  By comparing the two, we can address the 
question if mispricing is more severe with regards to dividend value or with regards to the other 
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asset.  Note that DF and PD can be compared, allowing us to assess if the dividend value or the 
arbitrage opportunity guides the equilibration dynamics in our experiment.  Similar measures for 
mispricing have been proposed in the literature for the single-asset market (e.g, Stöckl, Huber 
and Kirchler 2010).  In particular, the relative deviation RD of asset j = L, U, where * is the 
average cumulative dividend value, has been used to measure magnitudes of bubbles in 
experiments.   
ABCD3EFB BFED3EGH = A =  1* 9 ' − *'
=
'>?
 (7) 
Potential discrepancies can arise in real-time in submitted orders.  If the adjusted bid 
exceeds the best outstanding offer of the twin share, an arbitrageur can sell high and buy low, 
thereby realize a (expected) gain.  Under perfect correlation, the gain from eliminating a price 
discrepancy is riskless (arbitrage); under no-correlation the expected gain is risky, since 
differences in future dividends can induce losses or gains.  We call discrepant each limit order 
that (upon submission) leads to a cross-asset discrepancy in outstanding orders, i.e., opens a 
potential expected gain for another trader.21  We measure the relative frequency of discrepant 
limit order submission, RFDLOi, for each subject i and aggregate as follows; where #LOi denotes 
the number of limit orders submitted by the subject, and #DLOi is the number of discrepant limit 
orders.  
A*IJK =  #IJK#IJK  
A*IJ = ∑ #IJKK∑ #IJKK  
(8) 
                                                 
21 In a different trading environment, Biais and Pouget (1999, p.  15) refer to similar trades as “a noise trading [cf.  
Shleifer and Summers 1990] component in the order flow … as they [tend] ...  to lose money.” 
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We measure a trader’s aptitude is measured by the reverse of the frequency of submitting 
a discrepant limit order, (1 - RFDLOi).  The trader’s aptitude is therefore high if RFDLOi is small 
and vice versa.  
Our empirical measure of acuity is the individual’s CRT score, i.e., the number of correct 
answers in the pre-market cognitive reflection task (Frederick 2005).  Recent results in single-
asset market experiments have shown systematic effects of CRT scores (Corgnet et al.  2015, 
Akiyama, Hanaki, and Ishikawa 2013; Breaban and Noussair 2014, Noussair et al. 2016).  Below, 
we also measure the effect of gender and risk aversion (as elicited in the investment game) on 
our mispricing measures (4) – (8).  Recent research from experimental single-asset markets 
suggests that price levels may be lower if the level of risk aversion increases (Breaban and 
Noussair 2014) and also if the share of female traders increases (Eckel and Füllbrunn 2015).   
 
3.B. Testable Hypotheses 
With measures (4) – (8) at hand we next formulate our testable hypotheses.  Our most efficient 
theoretical benchmark (which is standard in the experimental studies that apply the Smith et al.  
1988 design, but is unlikely to obtain with inexperienced subjects in the laboratory) requires 
prices to be equal to risk-neutral fundamental dividend values.   
Hypothesis 0 (Risk-neutral pricing): There will be no deviations of prices from fundamentals in 
either share class, i.e., * = 0.    
In line with the literature, we also look at a weak form of Hypothesis 0, that is, we 
investigate if the RD measure is equal to zero on average.  Risk-neutral pricing would require 
that the price equals the fundamental dividend value in each period.  In fact, risk-neutral pricing 
is a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for obtaining MM invariance (Modigliani and Miller 
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1958).  Indeed, previous experimental evidence (Palan 2013) shows that pricing deviations from 
fundamental dividend value can be expected to occur in experimental asset markets in both 
directions from above and below.  This evidence does not invalidate the MM law of arbitrage-
free pricing.  For arbitrage-free pricing and the MM theorem we require that our L-share and U-
share are priced at parity, which is indeed a much weaker requirement than risk-neutral 
equilibrium pricing.   
Hypothesis 1A (MM invariance theorem): The adjusted market values of L-shares and U-shares 
will be the same, i.e., ∆'= 0.  1B (No cross-asset price discrepancy): 8 = 0. 1C (No discrepant 
orders): A*IJ = 0. 
Hypothesis 1A requires that an L-share and a U-share (adjusted for fundamentals) are 
priced the same on average.  Hypothesis 1B (which implies 1A) requires that eventual deviations 
from fundamentals occur simultaneously and equally in both shares.  Hence, we investigate three 
levels of market efficiency; the first is based on the absence of differences from parity pricing on 
average (H1A), the second is based on the absence of price discrepancies (H1B) and discrepant 
orders (H1C), and the third requires that prices coincide with risk-neutral dividend values (H0).    
These levels of market efficiency are tested in two treatment dimensions.  First, we 
consider perfect correlation where elimination of pricing discrepancies is riskless, since dividend 
streams differ by a constant and can be arbitraged.  Second, we consider the case of no 
correlation, where elimination of pricing discrepancies is risky because dividends are 
independent of each other.  Since the L-share and the U-share have identical idiosyncratic risks 
in both treatments, and based on earlier evidence that suggests insensitivity of behavior to 
changes in return correlations (e.g., Kroll et al.  1988), one might expect no treatment effect in 
the laboratory.  However, the MM arbitrage result concerns only the relative pricing of two 
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assets, not the absolute level of their prices.  Thus, it could be that both assets are mispriced in 
absolute terms but their relative pricing is aligned, so there is no arbitrage opportunity.  Given 
that mispricing has been frequently observed in the considered experimental design, we expected 
to observe some mispricing in our experiments and state the following testable hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2.  (Hedging effect): The cross-asset price discrepancy (PD) will be larger in the no-
correlation treatment than in the perfect-correlation treatment. 
The hypothesis suggests that markets can eliminate some price discrepancies in the 
absence of risk even without a dedicated (automatic) arbitrageur, and so decrease the magnitude 
of the PD-value in the presence of perfect correlation.  Hypothesis 2 suggests the relative validity 
of MM invariance under perfect correlation, relative to no correlation. 
Anticipating from experimental evidence of mispricing in early markets (e.g., Smith et al.  
1988, Dufwenberg et al.  2005), we expect a decrease of mispricing in our consecutive markets.   
Hypothesis 3.  (Experience effect): The cross-asset price discrepancy (PD), the deviation from 
fundamental dividend value (DF), and the relative frequency of discrepant orders (RFDLO) will 
decrease over time (in consecutive markets).   
It is an oft-cited conjecture that smart investors eliminate mispricing in the market (see 
e.g., Shleifer 2000).  Although our design has no dedicated arbitrageur, we can nevertheless 
address the predictive power of this argument in our data.  We compare the magnitude of price 
discrepancies vis-à-vis characteristics of market participants, suggesting a relationship between 
acuity and aptitude of traders. 
Hypothesis 4.  (Smart trader effect) The cross-asset price discrepancy (PD), deviation from 
fundamental dividend value (DF), and the relative frequency of discrepant orders (RFDLO) will 
decrease with the market participants’ degree of measured acuity.   
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We are also interested in the equilibration dynamics of the market.  When a price 
discrepancy arises, that is, when the L-share and the U-share are mispriced relative to one 
another, at least one share (if not both) are mispriced vis-à-vis the fundamental dividend value.  
Exploitation of this mispricing leads to expected gains.  We anticipate that the more profitable 
trade will happen first in both treatments.  The more profitable trade is the one whose expected 
return is the larger one within the discrepancy pair.  It can be either a long or short position.  
Moreover, we also expect, especially in the perfect-correlation treatment (but also in the no-
correlation treatment), that subjects exploit price discrepancies by simultaneously taking long 
and short positions, thus eliminating the discrepancy and booking an arbitrage (expected) gain.  
The latter behavior is what MM suggest in their arbitrage proof. 
Hypothesis 5A (Equilibration dynamics) Where cross-asset price discrepancy arises the higher 
expected return twin share trades first.  5B (Asset swap/MM arbitrage) The price discrepancy is 
exploited through (almost) simultaneous trade in the twin shares by the same subject.   
Finally, we investigate the effect of return correlation on individual portfolio 
diversification.  Portfolio diversification reduces fluctuations in portfolio returns when 
correlations are smaller.  Financial economics suggests that people are averse to return volatility.  
Therefore, we conjecture that the difference between the number of U-shares and L-shares is 
smaller in the no-correlation treatment than in the perfect correlation treatment.22  Let 1#K' and 
1$K' be the number of U-shares and L-shares in the portfolio of subject i at the end of period t, 
and N1K' = |1#K' − 1$K'| is the absolute difference of the two numbers.  We compare the average 
                                                 
22 Our measure of diversification is very simple. We look at individual deviations from the market portfolio.  
Investor subjects are perfectly diversified in our design if they hold an equal number of L-shares and U-shares.  
Different from the no-correlation treatment, return volatility does not decrease with increased diversification in the 
perfect-correlation treatment.   
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individual portfolio diversification over subjects and periods, which we denote by dZ(ρLU), 
across markets and treatments.   
Hypothesis 6 (individual portfolio diversification) Subjects are more diversified in the no-
correlation treatment (0) than in the perfect correlation treatment (1), N1607  ≤ N1617. 
  
4. Results 
In total, 174 students participated, earning an average of $50 in 3 hours.  Each participated in 
only one session.  We have 12 sessions in the perfect-correlation treatment and eight sessions in 
the no-correlation treatment.23 Each session is comprised of four consecutive markets.24   
 
4.A.  MM invariance theorem  
Observation 1.  L-share and U-share prices are close to parity and in line with the MM 
invariance theorem in the perfect-correlation treatment.  U-share prices are above parity 
in the no-correlation treatment.  
Support.  In Figure 1, we see the difference of L-share and U-share prices relative to parity for 
each market, period, and treatment, aggregated separately over the 12 sessions of the perfect-
correlation treatment and the eight sessions of the no-correlation treatment.  In the case of a 
                                                 
23 We do not have the same number of sessions across treatments.  Unfortunately, we discovered a problem in the 
software after conducting the first four sessions.  Owing to this problem, the L-share holders received no cash 
dividend; instead, both L-share and U-share dividends were distributed to U-share holders.  Due to logistical and 
timing problems, we were unable to book the lab to conduct these four sessions and so have only eight cohorts in the 
no-correlation treatment rather the planned 12 cohorts.  
24 In the fourth market of one session of the perfect-correlation treatment, one subject submitted an obviously 
erroneous bid (instead of an asking price) for $20 on the L-share worth $0.24 that led to a transaction.  We have 
eliminated the period from the data as the transaction impacts our average estimates.  In the second market of the 
two other perfect-correlation sessions, the data for period 10 are missing (due to a server crash).  One session of the 
perfect-correlation treatment and two sessions of the no-correlation treatments had only seven participants. 
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missing price of L-share or U-share, the period in the session is treated as a missing 
observation.25  The prices in the perfect-correlation treatment are close to parity, whereas the 
prices in the no-correlation treatment are above parity.  In view of our theoretical discussion, we 
note that no direction of deviation could be predicted.  In contrast, the data suggest that the 
deviation of relative market valuation has a direction, indicating a relatively higher price for the 
U-share than the L-share.26  Below we further investigate the pattern.   
 
Figure 1.  Evolution of relative difference from price-parity of L-shares and U-shares ∆O 
The abscissa shows the periods 1 to 10 and represents price parity between L-share and U-share prices.  
The ordinate indicates the relative difference from parity from -0.2 to 0.6.  Each chart represents the 
relative difference from price-parity for one market of 10 periods; markets 1-4 are represented top left, 
top right, bottom left, and bottom right.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 On average we have 11% and 5% missing observations in the perfect-correlation and no-correlation treatments, 
respectively. 
26 In this context the dividend puzzle comes to mind (DeAngelo and DeAngelo 2006), that is, the empirical 
observation that the market value of dividend-paying stock is higher than of zero dividend stock.  Whereas the U-
share always pays a positive dividend, the L-share indeed pays a zero dividend 25% of the time. 
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Table 2 reports the average differences from parity for each market in both treatments 
jointly with the Z-statistics of the two-tailed Wilcoxon one-sample test that indicates significant 
deviations from zero.  The recorded average results for the perfect-correlation treatment are not 
significantly different from parity in any market, ∆'= 0; the overall average price difference 
from parity per period is 3.67%.  By period, we find that only three of 40 (= 4 markets x 10 
periods) differences from parity in the perfect-correlation treatment are significant at the five 
percent level; the pricier share is once the L-share and twice the U-share.27  In the no-correlation 
treatment, parity is rejected for each market since the U-share is always pricier than the L-share 
(see Table 2); the overall average price difference from parity per period is 23.32 percent in the 
no-correlation treatment, but only 3.67 percent in the perfect-correlation treatment.28   
So, the differences from price parity are much smaller in the perfect-correlation treatment 
than in the no-correlation treatment; these differences are four to fifteen times larger in the no-
correlation treatment in the four markets.  Overall, the average difference from parity per period 
across the treatments is highly-significant, with the p-value of the two-tailed Mann-Whitney test 
being 0.004.  We conclude that our data are in line with the MM theorem (and thus with 
Hypothesis 1A) in the perfect-correlation treatment, but reject Hypothesis 1A for the no-
correlation treatment.   
The observation indicates that riskless exploitation of discrepancies, as in the perfect-
correlation treatment, is required to approximate value invariance.  In the no-correlation 
treatment the discrepancy thus seems to have two complementary potential sources.  One, the 
exploitation of discrepancies is risky, since the future dividend streams do not allow riskless 
                                                 
27 The L-share is significantly pricier than the U-share in the first period of the first market (p = 0.041), and the U-
share is pricier in period 10 of the first market (p = 0.041) and in period 7 of the third market (p = 0.039).   
28 Since outliers could be affecting the averages, we redid the analyses with median prices instead of simple average 
prices.  The results are very similar and are shown in Tables A1, A2A, and A2B in the Online Appendix.  
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arbitrage.  The risky exploitation of a discrepancy requires a risk premium, implying larger 
discrepancies.  Second, the market discounts the U-share less than the L-share.  In principle, this 
could indicate the existence of a certainty effect in the data (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) 
concerning non-zero payoffs: while the U-share dividend is strictly positive by definition, the L-
share dividend can be zero in every period.  However, our follow-up treatments (see below) do 
not find supporting evidence, and so the reason for this behavior is not completely clear to us.  
 
Table 2.  Average difference from parity ∆ in percent 
The table records the difference from parity (4) averaged over ten periods and all 
sessions for each market and both treatment.  The first column records the averages 
for the perfect correlation treatment and the second column for the no-correlation 
treatment. The bottom line shows the average difference from parity over all periods.  
Asterisks indicate significant differences from parity measured by the two tailed, one-
sample Wilcoxon signed-ranks test.  The last column shows the p-value resulting from 
the two tailed, two-sample Mann-Whitney test.  Z-statistics are recorded in brackets.  
Significant differences are indicated;  ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.   
Treatment 
 
Perfect correlation 
(n = 12) 
No correlation 
(n = 8) 
Mann-Whitney test 
(between 
treatments), 
p-value, [Z-
statistic] 
Market 1 
6.98 
[0.39] 
27.72** 
[2.24] 
0.031** 
[2.16] 
Market 2 
1.72 
[0.04] 
29.92** 
[2.52] 
0.001*** 
[3.28] 
Market 3 
3.49 
[1.49] 
17.94** 
[2.10] 
0.165 
[1.39] 
Market 4 
2.62 
[1.26] 
14.49** 
[2.52] 
0.064* 
[1.85] 
Average 
3.67 
[1.53] 
22.52** 
[2.52] 
0.006*** 
[2.78] 
 
4.B.  Pricing discrepancies and deviation from fundamentals 
Observation 2.  Absolute difference from parity (PD), the deviation from fundamentals 
(DF) and the relative frequency of discrepant orders (RFDLO) are reduced in the 
perfect-correlation treatment relative to the no-correlation treatment.   
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Support.  The data in Table 3A, Table 3B and Table 3C record the averages of PD-value, DF-
value and RFDLO by treatment, respectively.29  From Table 3A we see that by buying the lower-
priced share and selling the higher-priced twin share (both at the average price in a randomly-
determined period), the average riskless return would be 23 percent of the trading value in the 
first market of the perfect-correlation treatment.  This number is relatively large if compared to 
the second market, where the average PD-value drops to one half of the first market.30  However, 
the amount of the decrease is rather small relative to the first market in the no-correlation 
treatment.  As indicated by the one-tailed Mann-Whitney test recorded in the table, the PD-value 
is larger overall (at the 10% significance level) than in the no-correlation treatment.   
We see in Table 3B that the results for the DF-value point in the same direction.  The 
overall average absolute deviation from the fundamental dividend value is 19.13 percent in the 
perfect-correlation treatment and 27.39 percent in the no-correlation treatment.  Nevertheless, the 
differences between the two treatments are only significant (at the five percent level) for the 
second market.  The results suggest that pricing relative to fundamentals is (relatively) 
independent of whether there are perfect arbitrage conditions.  In line with the literature, both 
treatments trend towards the fundamental dividend value with repetition.  We conclude that the 
data rather support than reject Hypothesis 2 and Observation 2 vis-à-vis the PD and DF values, 
particularly for Market 2, although the evidence is not statistically-significant for all markets.   
Table 3C records the average number of discrepant orders relative to the submitted orders 
in a market.  The overall average number of discrepant limit orders is 5.70 percent in the perfect-
                                                 
29 These values have been computed according to equations (5), (6) and (8).  A missing average price of L-share or 
U-share in a certain period is treated as a missing observation in the corresponding session.  The minimum PD-value 
overall markets and the first quartile in the perfect-correlation treatment is 1.1 percent and 8.4 percent, and in the no-
correlation treatment 5.0 percent and 13.7 percent, respectively. 
30 The decrease from the first to the second market is significant at the one percent level (Z = 2.353, p = 0.009, one-
tailed Mann-Whitney test, n = 12).   
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3428299 
 
 
28
correlation treatment and 10.22 percent in the no-correlation treatment.  The differences are 
significant across treatments.   
In terms of absolute numbers of arbitrage and mispricing, Hypothesis 0 and Hypothesis 
1B and 1C must be rejected given that no session and market involves a zero DF-value, a zero 
PD-value, or zero RFDLO-value. 
 
Table 3A: Average absolute deviation from parity PD in percent 
The table records the price discrepancy (5) for the ten market periods averaged over all 
sessions for each market and treatment. The bottom lines show the average price 
discrepancy over all periods, and the one-tailed Page trend test that checks for a 
significant decline in repeated markets.  The last column shows the p-value resulting 
from the two tailed, two-sample Mann-Whitney test.  Z-statistics are recorded in 
brackets.  Significant differences are indicated;  ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.   
^One-tailed tests. 
 
Perfect 
correlation 
(n1 = 12) 
No correlation 
(n2 = 8) 
Mann-Whitney test 
(between treatments), 
p-value, [Z-statistic]^ 
Market 1 24.59 39.52 
0.316 
[1.00] 
Market 2 15.25 30.36 
0.045** 
[2.01] 
Market 3 15.87 22.34 
0.32 
[1.00] 
Market 4 21.65 17.35 
0.758 
[-0.31] 
Total 19.34 27.39 
0.563 
[0.58] 
p-value (one-tailed 
Page trend test)^ 
0.159 
[-1.00] 
0.011** 
[-2.30] 
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Table 3B: Average absolute deviation from fundamentals DF in percent 
The table records the deviation from fundamentals (6) for the ten market periods averaged 
over all sessions for each market and treatment.  The bottom lines show the average 
deviation from fundamentals over all periods, and the one-tailed Page trend test that 
checks for a significant decline in repeated markets.  The last column shows the p-value 
resulting from the two tailed, two-sample Mann-Whitney test.  Z-statistics are recorded in 
brackets.  Significant differences are indicated;  ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.   ^One-
tailed tests. 
 
Perfect 
correlation 
(n1 = 12) 
No correlation 
(n2 = 8) 
Mann-Whitney test 
(between treatments), 
p-value [Z-statistic] 
Market 1 24.59 39.52 
0.316 
[1.00] 
Market 2 14.42 30.36 
0.030** 
[2.16] 
Market 3 15.87 22.34 
0.316 
[1.00] 
Market 4 21.65 17.35 
0.622 
[-0.31] 
Total 19.13 27.39 
0.143 
[1.47] 
p-value (one-tailed 
Page trend test)^ 
.159 
[-1.00] 
.001*** 
[-3.30] 
 
 
 
Observation 3.  The consecutive-markets analysis suggests reduced price discrepancies 
with experienced subjects, which occurs earlier in the perfect-correlation treatment than 
in the no-correlation treatment.  We observe no change in the relative frequency of 
discrepant limit orders. 
Support.  Eyeballing the data in Tables 3A and 3B (see also Tables A2A and A2B in the Online 
Appendix, which is also appended to this working paper), our measures indicate a decrease of 
price discrepancies in the first three consecutive markets, but not always from the third to the 
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fourth market.  The non-parametric Page trend test (n = 12, k = 4) as reported in the bottom line 
of Table 3A suggests no significant decrease of the PD-value over four markets in the perfect-
correlation treatment;31 on the other hand, the test results reported in Table 3B do indicate a 
decrease for the deviation from fundamentals that is significant at the 10 percent level.  The 
results of the one-tailed Page test are significant at the five percent level for the no-correlation 
treatment, indicating a reduction over time of the PD-value and DF-value.   
 
Table 3C: Average rel. freq. of discrepant limit orders RFDLO in percent 
The table records the frequency of discrepant limit orders relative to submitted limit orders 
(8) by session for each market and treatment. The bottom lines show the average relative 
frequency of discrepant limit orders over all periods, and the one-tailed Page trend test that 
checks for a significant decline in repeated markets.  The last column shows the p-value 
resulting from the two tailed, two-sample Mann-Whitney test.  Z-statistics are recorded in 
brackets.  Significant differences are indicated;  ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.   ^One-
tailed tests. 
 
Perfect 
correlation 
(n1 = 12) 
No correlation 
(n2 = 8) 
Mann-Whitney test 
(between treatments), 
p-value, [Z-statistic] 
Market 1 6.76 10.90 
0.190 
[1.31] 
Market 2 4.96 10.58 
0.123 
[1.54] 
Market 3 4.81 9.61 
0.105 
[1.62] 
Market 4 5.51 9.81 
0.037** 
[2.08] 
Total 5.51 10.23 
0.045** 
[2.01] 
p-value (one-tailed Page 
trend test)^ 
0.242 
[-.70] 
0.460 
[-.10] 
 
 
We have no significant evidence for the continuous convergence to the theoretical 
predictions over all the four markets in the perfect-correlation treatment, since convergence 
                                                 
31 In the fourth market in some sessions, subjects push prices to irrationally high levels in late periods.  Even if these 
data points were ignored, however, the price discrepancies would not be reduced from the level of Market 3.  That 
said, the reported p-value of the Page test suggests that a declining PD-value in the perfect-correlation treatment 
would then be significant at the five percent level.   
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seems to occur all at once from the first to second market, after which deviations remain at the 
same level until the end.  Thus, the perfect-correlation treatment exhibits a significant decline at 
the five percent level in PD-value and DF-value between the first and the second markets, but 
not between any other consecutive markets.32 On the other hand, the main decline in the no-
correlation treatment occurs from Market 2 to Market 3.33  Thus, the data suggest a more rapid 
adjustment to the theoretical benchmarks in the perfect-correlation treatment, i.e., when an 
exploitation of price discrepancies is riskless.   
Table 3C suggests no decline of the RFDLO by the one-tailed Page test.  
 
Observation 4.  The differences between PD and DF suggest that pricing discrepancies 
are a more focal driver of behavior than the deviation from fundamentals in the perfect-
correlation treatment when compared to the no-correlation treatment. 
Support.  Comparing Tables 3A and 3B, the PD-values are smaller than the DF-values for each 
market of the perfect-correlation treatment and larger for each market of the no-correlation 
treatment.34 The average difference between PD-values and DF-values over all markets is -0.029 
in the perfect-correlation treatment and 0.017 in the no-correlation treatment.  The difference 
between treatments is significant; per the one-tailed Mann Whitney two-sample test, the p-value 
is 0.071.  Hence, the data suggest that the pricing vis-à-vis the other asset is focal in the perfect-
                                                 
32 The p-values of the one-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test that suggest a decline between first and second market 
are as follows; PD-value (p = 0.010, Z = 2.316), and DF-value (p = 0.009, Z = 2.353).   
33 The PD-value (p = 0.034, Z = 1.820) and the DF-value (p = 0.034, Z = 1.820) decrease significantly at the five 
percent level between Market 2 and Market 3 only, but not between Market 1 and Market 2 (p = 0.116, Z = 1.193), 
(p = 0.104, Z = 1.260).     
34 On average over all markets, the difference between PD-value and DF-value is significantly different from zero in 
the perfect correlation treatment.  Per the two-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test, the p-value is 0.0995.  In the no-
correlation treatment we have no significant differences between PD-value and DF-value. 
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correlation treatment compared with the no-correlation treatment.  The results reported in section 
5.5, where we examine at the equilibrating dynamics, underline this effect. 
 
4.C.  Bubble magnitude 
Following the standard line of experimental asset-market research, we report the standard 
measure of bubble magnitude RD (relative deviation) for our treatments by asset.  Given that the 
literature on the single-asset market has shown that mispricing of assets frequently occurs (Palan 
2013), we have a surprising result:  
 
Observation 5.  a) Asset prices average close to the dividend value in the perfect-
correlation treatment.  The RD measures of the L-share and the U-share are near zero.  b) 
The price of the U-share in the no-correlation treatment exceeds the dividend value, i.e., 
the RD measure is significantly positive, while the average price of the L-share is close to 
the expected dividend value.   
Support.  Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the average price trajectories for all sessions and overall.  
Table 4 records for each market (by treatment) the standard measure of mispricing the relative 
deviation RD measure for the L-share and the U-share (and their differences) as described in 
section 4 and as commonly applied in the literature (Stöckl, Huber and Kirchler 2010).  The 
figure illustrates observations 5a) and 5b).  The overall average RD measures are -0.041 and 
0.171 for the L-share and the U-share in the no-correlation treatment and -0.025 and 0.023 for 
the perfect-correlation treatment.  The deviations from expected cumulative dividend value are 
statistically significant for the U-share in the no-correlation treatment, where the RD measure is 
significantly different from (i.e., larger than) zero for each market and overall.  In the perfect- 
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Figure 2.  Average prices in markets 1-4 (left to right, top to bottom) of the Perfect Correlation 
treatment 
The trajectories of all 12 cohorts are displayed for both assets L-share and U-share, and the average for 
each asset is indicated in bold.  The dividend values are displayed by cascading short horizontal lines, 
but here they are almost covered by the lines that indicate the overall averages. The ordinate indicates 
the average prices from 0 to 700, and the abscissa the periods 1 to 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Avg prices in markets 1-4 (left to right, top to bottom) of the No Correlation treatment 
The trajectories of all 8 cohorts are displayed for both assets L-share and U-share, and the average for 
each asset is indicated in bold.  The dividend values are displayed by cascading short horizontal lines, 
which are well visible for the U-share.  They are almost covered for the L-share by the lines that indicate 
the overall averages. The ordinate indicates the average prices from 0 to 700, and the abscissa the 
periods 1 to 10. 
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Table 4: Average RD measure and difference between shares in percent 
The table records the average relative deviation (7) for each market, assets L, and U, and 
treatment. The bottom line shows the average over all markets.  The third and sixth columns 
show the differences between RD values of assets L and U.  The RD-values and their 
differences between assets L and U are tested. Z-statistics are recorded in brackets.  
Significant differences from zero resulting from the two tailed, one-sample Wilcoxon signed 
ranks test are indicated; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.        
 Perfect correlation 
(n1 = 12) 
 No correlation 
(n0= 8) 
 A$ A# A#-A$  A$ A# A#-A$ 
Market 1 2.80 
[0.31] 
9.48 
[1.02] 
6.68 
[0.16] 
 0.24 
[0.56] 
22.13** 
[2.38] 
21.90* 
[1.68] 
Market 2 -5.53 
[-1.10] 
-0.01 
[-0.39] 
4.92 
[1.02] 
 -5.03 
[0.14] 
22.49*** 
[2.52] 
27.52*** 
[2.52] 
Market 3 -11.00** 
[-2.28] 
-2.19 
[-0.83] 
8.82** 
[2.28] 
 -5.91 
[-0.21] 
12.57** 
[2.24] 
18.48* 
[1.40] 
Market 4 3.68 
[-0.24] 
2.44 
[0.39] 
-1.24 
[0.24] 
 -5.54 
[0.14] 
11.40** 
[2.38] 
16.94** 
[2.38] 
Total 
avg. 
-2.51 
[-.78] 
2.28 
[1.26] 
4.79 
[0.94] 
 -4.06 
[0.14] 
17.15** 
[2.52] 
21.21*** 
[2.52] 
 
 
correlation treatment, the overall RD measure is not significantly different from zero; a 
significant (negative) RD measure is only recorded for the L-share in market 3. 
Comparing across assets, we find that the RD measures of the L-share and the U-share 
are significantly different in the no-correlation treatment; in the perfect-correlation treatment 
there are no significant differences between RD measures of the L-share and the U-share.35  If we 
compare RD measures between treatments and shares, we find that only the RD measure of the 
U-share in the no-correlation treatment is significantly different from (i.e., larger than) the 
others.36  This misbehavior of the U-share is puzzling and seems to mainly drive the reported 
violation of parity pricing in the no-correlation treatment.  The Spearman rank correlation 
                                                 
35 Based on the two-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test results we reject the null hypothesis of equal RD measures 
between L-share and U-share for the no-correlation treatment; the p-value is 0.012.  In the perfect-correlation 
treatment the p-value is 0.347 and so we conclude that the RD measures do no significantly differ across assets. 
36 The p-values of the two-tailed Mann-Whitney two-sample test (on the total average) are as follows; between U-
shares (p = 0.000), between L-shares (0.227); between the difference of U-share and L-share (0.007). 
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between the A# and ∆ are 0.168 and 0.810 in the perfect-correlation and the no-correlation 
treatments, respectively; the latter indicates a significant correlation (p-value is 0.015) whereas 
the former does not (p-value is 0.602).37  The question here is why the deviations occur in the U-
share of the no-correlation treatment and not in the L-share.  Below we investigate this finding 
further by looking at the market behavior and at the valuations of the L-share and the U-share in 
the single-asset market. 
 
4.D.  Smart traders  
Observation 6.  Individual performance (i.e. payoff) correlates with measured acuity.   
Support.  Table 5A reports regression results.  We use the subject’s average payoff over the four 
markets as the individual-performance measure.  As stated above, we measure individual acuity 
by the CRT score, i.e., the individual’s number of correct answers.  The average CRT score in 
our sample was 0.97.38  As a risk-aversion measure we use the individual percentage allocation 
to the safe asset in the investment game; the average allocation was 60 percent.  Finally, we 
consider gender, assigning value one for a female investor and zero otherwise.  The share of 
females is 49 percent in our subject pool (see subject-pool composition details in Table A3 in the 
Online Appendix which is also appended to this paper).39   
 
                                                 
37 Note also that the differences in RD-values between L-share and U-share and deviations from parity are highly 
correlated.  The Spearman rank correlation coefficient is 0.862 on the overall sample, which is significant at any 
commonly accepted significance level (p-value is 0.000).   
38 This is a bit lower than average (see Frederick (2005), who finds an average in a very large sample of 1.24).  One 
might have expected a better result here for CRT because of incentivization.  The lower number could have resulted 
from the fact that our subjects were time constrained whereas Frederick’s were not.   
39 As in many previous studies (see Charness and Gneezy, 2012), our measure finds that females are significantly 
more financially risk averse than males (Z = 2.366, p = 0.018, two-tailed test).  In line with the results of Frederick 
(2005), we also find that males in our sample have significantly higher CRT scores (Z = 3.838, p < 0.001, two-tailed 
test). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3428299 
 
 
36
Table 5A.  Regression results 
The first two columns record the outcomes of the cluster regression with robust standard errors of 
the within-group individual payoff and aptitude (the reciprocal of the relative frequency of a limit 
order that opens up an arbitrage opportunity) on the individual CRT-score (8), Risk Aversion, and 
FEM gender dummy.  The other columns record the OLS regression results of measures (4)-(8) on 
the group average of the individual measures.  The results of two-tailed t-tests are indicated [Z-
statistics in brackets]; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p ≤ 0.10. 
 
Variable Payoffi 
 
1-RFDLOi ∆ PD DF RFDLO A# 
Intercept 
2717.9*** 
[22.8] 
0.976*** 
[138.9] 
0.925** 
[0.02] 
0.949* 
[2.04] 
0.811** 
[2.73] 
0.345*** 
[3.42] 
0.514** 
[2.77] 
CRT-score 
161.8*** 
[3.67] 
0.005** 
[2.07] 
-0.643*** 
[-3.84] 
-
0.69*** 
[-3.10] 
-
0.579*** 
[-4.06] 
-
0.142*** 
[-2.98] 
-0.30*** 
[-3.34] 
Female 
-241.0*** 
[-2.90] 
0.008 
[1.31] 
-0.198 
[-1.20] 
-0.164 
[-0.75] 
0.114 
[0.81] 
-0.086*    
[-1.82] 
-0.058          
[-0.66] 
Risk aversion 
-0.76 
[-0.59] 
-0.000 
[-0.52] 
0.001 
[0.12] 
0.002 
[0.29] 
-0.000 
[-0.09] 
-0.001   
[-0.75] 
-0.000           
[-0.12] 
perf. 
correlation 
treatment 
dummy 
  
-0.824***          
[-3.10] 
-0.81**       
[-2.29] 
-0.506**       
[-2.23] 
-0.154*       
[-2.04] 
-0.369**       
[-2.60] 
CRT-score x 
treatment 
dummy 
  
0.646**   
[2.42] 
0.697*   
[1.95] 
0.427*   
[1.87] 
0.102   
[1.35] 
0.218   
[1.53] 
#obs. 174 174 20 20 20 20 20 
#clusters 20 20      
R-squared .125 .039 .653 .484 .640 .591 .728 
 
 
The outcomes of the ordinary-least-square regression of the individual performance 
measure on the CRT score, Female, and Risk aversion are recorded in the first column of Table 
5A.  The OLS regressions use clustered standard errors (clustered by independent session).  As 
indicated, the CRT score is a significant determinant of the individual performance in this 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3428299 
 
 
37
regression, but gender and the risk-aversion measure are not significant.  We find no significant 
differences across treatments.40  The evidence clearly supports Observation 6. 
Instead of measuring performance by payoff as in Observation 6, we can measure 
performance by the number of bad decisions in trading.  As explained above, we compute the 
ratio of the number of discrepant limit orders to total limit orders, RFDLOi.  This ratio is next 
compared to the individual CRT score.   
 
Observation 7.  The trader’s aptitude is correlated with the measured individual acuity. 
Support.  The trader’s aptitude is reversely related to the relative frequency of submissions of 
discrepant limit orders to the trader’s total number of submitted limit orders, (1 - RFDLOi).  As 
characterized above, a discrepant limit order offers an arbitrageur’s opportunity to realize a 
(expected) gain by swapping assets.  The measured trader’s aptitude is regressed on individual 
characteristics.  The second column of Table 5A records OLS regressions with clustered standard 
errors (clustered by independent cohort).  We find that the individual acuity measured by the 
CRT score thus explains much of the bidding data, supporting Observation 7.   
 
Observation 8.  When there is high overall trader acuity, price discrepancies are smaller, 
fewer discrepant orders are submitted, and the price of assets is closer to parity.   
Support.  In Table 5A we also record four OLS regressions of our measures (4)-(6), (8) on the 
group aggregate personal measures.  In these regressions the average CRT score always shows 
up significantly.  The difference of price from parity, deviation from fundamentals, and price 
                                                 
40 The two-tailed Mann-Whitney test between treatments returns the following p-values on the individual-level data, 
0.559 (risk aversion), 0.809 (Female) and 0.987 (CRT score), and similar p-value results on the session-level data, 
0.165 (risk aversion), 0.754 (Female), and 0.529 (CRT score). 
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discrepancy as well as the relative frequency of discrepant orders decrease in markets with 
overall high trader acuity.  In the regression, we also control for treatment effects of CRT.  As 
the interaction with the treatment dummy indicates, the CRT-effect is strong for the no-
correlation treatment.  In Table 5B we report Spearman rank-correlation coefficients of the CRT 
score with our measures of market efficiency.  The coefficients also hint at a treatment effect.  
The correlation coefficients usually have the same sign in both treatments, but the magnitude of 
the coefficients is larger for the no-correlation treatment.  The reported test results indicate that 
the reported CRT effects could be driven by the no-correlation treatment.  So, as for Hypothesis 
4 and Observation 8, we conclude that acuity could actually affect reduction of price discrepancy; 
however, potential discrepancies do not disappear completely.     
 
Table 5B.  Spearman rank correlation coefficient with CRT score 
Correlation coefficients are reported for CRT effect in measures (4)-(8) 
for each treatment separately. The results of two-tailed Spearman rank 
correlation test are indicated; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p ≤ 0.10 
 ∆ PD DF RFDLO A# 
Perfect 
correlation 
treatment, n = 12 
-0.236 -0.271 -0.236 -0.268 -0.168 
No-correlation 
treatment, n = 8 
-0.732** -0.634* -0.634* -0.683* -0.927*** 
 
Observation 9.  When there is low overall trader acuity, or low trader aptitude, U-share 
prices exceed fundamentals in the no-correlation treatment.  There is no significant 
impact of trader acuity, risk aversion, or gender composition with either the L-share in 
the no-correlation treatment or either share in the perfect-correlation treatment.   
Support.  In the last column of Table 5A, we record a simple OLS regression of our acuity 
measure on the group aggregate personal measures for the no-correlation treatment.  The result 
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shows that the RD measure increases with decreasing CRT-score.  This effect is present in the U-
share of the no-correlation treatment only, as the effect in L-share and in the perfect-correlation 
treatment is not significantly different from zero (see also Table 5B).41     
 
4.E.  Equilibrating dynamics 
Observation 10.  The relative frequency of discrepancies in the perfect-correlation 
treatment is lower than in the no-correlation treatment.  Where a pricing discrepancy 
arises, subjects trade the high-expected-return twin share first rather than the less 
profitable one.  Individual subjects rarely exploit pricing discrepancies by asset swaps.   
Support.  As reported in Table 3C, on average 5.5 percent and 10.23 percent of all submitted 
orders lead to discrepancies in the order book for the perfect-correlation treatment and the no-
correlation treatment.42  We observe equilibrating dynamics as discussed in Section 4.  When a 
discrepancy arises, a trade in one twin share typically leads to a higher expected return than a 
trade in the other.  
As recorded in Table 6, the relative frequencies at which the high-return trade is enacted 
first are 0.886 and 0.916 in the perfect-correlation treatment and the no-correlation treatment.  
The results of the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test show that the equilibration dynamics work as 
suggested above, thus confirming Hypothesis 5A.  It is significantly more likely that a 
                                                 
41 A significant correlation of RDU measure and CRT-score is only notable in the no-correlation treatment.  
Conducting an OLS regression (with CRT as the only explanatory variable) separately for each treatment results in 
p-values of 0.318 (perfect correlation) and 0.026 (no correlation) for the slope of the CRT score.  The other 
explanatory variables including our measure of risk aversion and the gender share have no significant impact on any 
RD in the two treatments. 
42 The difference between treatments is in the expected direction, and significant as reported above.  The share of 
discrepancies and the PD-value in a session are highly correlated.  The OLS regression (on the level of the 
independent session) of the RFDLO-value on the PD-value indicates a significantly positive slope (z-statistic of 2.43, 
i.e., p = 0.026) and a determination coefficient of 0.25.  When a discrepancy arises, the median response time is 4 
seconds.   
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transaction occurs first in the high-expected-return twin-share, thus eliminating the price 
discrepancy without necessarily booking an arbitrage gain.  So prices are pushed in the direction 
of fundamental dividend value.43   
 
Table 6: Equilibrating dynamics: relative frequency of market orders in the 
high-expected-return share of given discrepancy 
The Table records the relative frequency in percent by which the market trades the 
more-profitable rather than the less-profitable share when a discrepancy arises.  
Significant differences per the one-tailed Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests are 
indicated;  ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.  Numbers in brackets are z-statistics. 
 Perfect 
correlation 
(n1 = 12) 
No 
correlation 
(n2 = 8) 
Two tailed Mann-Whitney 
test 
(between treatments), 
p-value [Z-statistic] 
Market 1 85.0*** 
[2.99] 
95.8*** 
[2.52] 
0.054** 
[2.47] 
Market 2 88.4*** 
[3.07] 
98.1*** 
[2.55] 
0.086* 
[1.71] 
Market 3 93.8*** 
[3.10] 
81.8** 
[2.25] 
0.332 
[-0.97] 
Market 4 87.0*** 
[3.07] 
90.9*** 
[2.52] 
0.586 
[0.56] 
Total 88.6*** 
[3.06] 
91.7*** 
[2.52] 
0.758 
[0.31] 
 
In fact, subjects rarely exploit the price discrepancy (as arbitrageurs would do) by selling 
the relatively expensive twin share and simultaneously buying the cheap one.  Such hedging 
trades happen about 1% of the time when a discrepancy arises.  Our hypothesis 5B is not 
supported by the data; 99% of discrepancies were eliminated by independent trades in the market 
rather than by individuals engaging in arbitrage; no arbitrageur subjects dominate the market.  
We conclude that the described market equilibration dynamics imply a narrowing of the gap 
between prices of twin shares in our treatments rather than high-skilled individual traders. 
                                                 
43 The effect is a bit stronger in the no-correlation treatment than in the perfect correlation treatment.  However, 
equilibration dynamics are strong in both treatments.  The difference is possibly related to the above-described fact 
that relative pricing is a more important driver of price behavior in the perfect correlation treatment than in the no-
correlation treatment. 
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4.F. Individual portfolio diversification 
Despite the fact that diversification can lower the return volatility in the no-correlation treatment, 
but not in the perfect-correlation treatment, the average individual difference in subjects’ 
portfolios of L-shares and U-shares is 2 (= dZ) in each treatment.  The difference in individual 
portfolio diversification between treatments is close to zero.44  Hence, we have no evidence in 
support of Hypothesis 6. 
 
4.G. Summary of experimental results 
We do not observe pricing of assets at fundamental dividend value, but we have support for 
Hypothesis 1A (MM invariance theorem) in our perfect-correlation treatment, where exploitation 
of a price discrepancy is riskless.  This differs in relative terms when we compare the data to the 
no-correlation treatment, where exploitation of price discrepancies across assets has risk.  
Hypothesis 1B (no price discrepancy) is not supported in either of our treatments as price 
discrepancies seem to persist.  Under perfect correlation, however, adjustment to a level where 
discrepancies stabilize is fast (achieved by the second market) whereas under no correlation 
adjustment takes at least more time.  Hypothesis 2 (hedging effect) is confirmed; the results on 
price discrepancies of the perfect-correlation treatment are closer to the theoretical prediction 
than those of the no-correlation treatment.    
Support for Hypothesis 3 (experience effect) is no surprise; experienced subjects trade 
closer to the theoretical predictions than inexperienced subjects.  Nonetheless, unlike the results 
of the single-asset market (Smith et al.  1988) our data do not suggest a complete convergence on 
fundamental dividend values or vanishing price discrepancies in repeated markets.  Moreover, 
                                                 
44 The p-value of the one-tailed Mann-Whitney between-sample tests is 0.47.   
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discrepant order submissions do not cease with repetition, as indicated by the stable relative 
frequency of discrepant limit orders.  We find some support for Hypothesis 4 (smart trader effect) 
as our measure of aptitude increases in our measure of acuity and market mispricing decreases 
with the measured level of acuity.  To the extent that experience may substitute for initial acuity, 
ours confirm other results in the experimental-asset-markets literature (Palan 2013).   
Our data support our equilibration Hypothesis 5A.  When a discrepancy arises, the more 
profitable transaction is enacted first thus pushing price dynamics towards fundamentals.  These 
dynamics occur in both treatments.  In the perfect-correlation treatment market equilibration both 
vis-à-vis fundamentals and vis-à-vis the balancing of relative prices is strong.  Both effects seem 
to lead to the confirmation of MM invariance in the perfect-correlation treatment.  We observe 
that discrepancies are fewer than in the no-correlation treatment.  Hypothesis 5B is not supported 
by our data since individual arbitraging through asset swaps is rare when discrepancies arise.     
There are two surprising effects here.  First, we observe no significant deviations from 
dividend value in the perfect-correlation treatment and for the L-share in the no-correlation 
treatment.  This result stands in opposition to the reports of mispricing in the single-asset market 
(see the survey by Palan 2013).  Second, we observe a positive significant deviation from 
dividend value only for the U-share in the no-correlation treatment in particular when trader 
aptitude is low.45  This effect seems to be driving the deviation from price parity in the no-
correlation treatment in the direction as reported in Observation 1.  Regarding the first effect, we 
must address the question of whether the co-existence of two assets tends to limit the occurrence 
of bubbles.  In fact, it has been suggested in the literature that trading in two assets can lead to 
smaller bubbles (Lee, Noussair, Plott 2001).  Other papers suggest that also a careful explanation 
                                                 
45 The correlation of the U-share bubble with low trader aptitude could be a spurious effect.  
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of the environment can lead to smaller bubbles (Kirchler and Huber 2012, Palan 2013).  If not 
spurious, the second effect could result from a behavioral bias such as the certainty effect 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1986).46  L-shares involve a possible zero dividend, since with 0.25 of 
probability a zero dividend can occur in each period.  In this context it seems noteworthy that the 
cumulative prospective utility of the lotteries corresponding to the L-share and the U-share 
differs by more than the difference in expected value when the parameter estimates of Tversky 
and Kahneman (1992) are applied.  There is a small risk of not receiving any dividend pay at all.  
Given the received literature and given our no-correlation treatment data, we test the following 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 7 (certainty effect). Share prices are higher when possible dividends are strictly 
positive than when dividends can be zero. 
We address the hypothesis in the following section in a between-subjects single-asset market 
experimental design.  In one treatment subjects trade the L-share and in the other treatment they 
trade the U-share.  We expect that the RD measure is greater for the U-share than for the L-share.  
In case we do not observe this effect in the single asset market setting, we must conclude that the 
reported U-share price results from relative market valuation in the no-correlation treatment.   
 
5. Further Experiments 
We conducted two additional treatments to further investigate patterns found in our two 
initial treatments; we describe these below. 
                                                 
46 Tversky and Kahneman (1986) reported evidence on the common ratio effect.  In binary-choice tasks with a safe 
pay and a risky lottery, they found that subjects had a preference for the safe pay if the risky lottery involved the 
possibility of a zero pay. 
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5.A. Single-asset market experiments 
We proceeded with a third treatment with only one asset to try to cleanly address the question of 
whether the above reported non-existence of bubbles results from the two-asset environment or 
rather from our general settings.47  This also helps us to address Observation 5b) to see if the 
higher relative market valuation of the U-share in the no-correlation treatment is a behavioral 
artifact, similar to the dividend puzzle, according to which shares with non-zero dividends fetch 
a higher price (DeAngelo and DeAngelo 2006).   
The experimental procedures in the single-asset market experiments were the same as 
those described above (see the instructions in the Online appendix which is appended to this 
paper).  However, instead of simultaneous trading in two assets, subjects traded in a single-asset 
market involving 10 end-of-period dividend draws.  Applying between-subjects variation, 
subjects traded the shares with the equally likely dividends {0, 8, 28, 60} in the L-share 
treatment and they traded the shares with the equally likely dividends {24, 32, 56, 84} in the U-
share treatment.  Different from the original sessions, subjects participated in only two (and not 
in four) consecutive repetitions of the asset market.48  The expected payoff for participation in 
the experiment was the same across all treatments.  In the L-share treatment, subjects were 
endowed with six shares, and in the U-share treatment subjects were endowed with three shares.  
Subjects were able to short-sell double the number of shares with which they were endowed.   
                                                 
47 Besides the two-asset setting, there are some other features in our design that could have contributed to the non-
existence of bubbles.  Subjects had to pass several comprehension tests and the expected dividend value was 
exhibited in each period on the subjects’ screens.  This transparency may have decreased the lack of common 
knowledge (Cheung, Hedgard, Palan 2014).  Short-selling is possible, which can increase downward pressures of 
prices (Haruvy and Noussair 2006). Also, the number of periods is 15 periods in the standard setting whereas it is 10 
in ours.   
48 In total, subjects traded three times in 10 periods in continuous double-auction markets.  Subjects traded in the L-
share or the U-share twice.  The third market of trading involved another experiment with single-period markets, 
which we describe further below.  In half of the sessions, we had the two single-asset markets first and then the 
single period markets.  In the other half the ordering was reversed.  We found no order effects, so we pool the data. 
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The data include eight independent cohorts in each of the L-share and U-share treatments, 
with each trading for two consecutive market rounds in the continuous double auction.  138 
subjects participated in these sessions.  As before, the market size was nine.49  
 
Observation 11.  L-share and U-share average prices are close to dividend value in the 
single-asset environment.   
Support.  Table 7 records the RD measures for the two single asset treatments. The recorded 
results of the Wilcoxon signed ranks test indicate that deviations of the RD measures are not 
significantly different from zero for any market of the single-asset treatments.  Compared to the 
RD measure of the U-share in the no-correlation treatment, the RD measures in the single-asset 
market treatments are significantly smaller.  Compared to each other, compared to the L-share in 
the no correlation treatment, and compared to the L-share and the U-share in the perfect 
correlation treatment, all differences are insignificant according to the results of the two-tailed 
Mann-Whitney test of two independent samples.50 
Observation 11 indicates that we have no systematic mispricing in the single-asset 
treatments.  In the literature, it has been suggested that a careful introduction of subjects to the 
environment could amend mispricing (Palan 2013).  In our experiment, subjects were informed 
in each period about the remaining dividend draws and the expected sum of remaining dividends.  
It is quite possible that that information influenced the decision making of subjects in our 
                                                 
49 In each of the two treatments, we had one cohort with seven, another with eight, and six with nine participants.   
50 The p-values of the test between single-asset market treatments are recorded in the table.  The p-values between 
RDs for the U-share in the no-correlation treatment and the U-share treatment are 0.046 and 0.016 for the first and 
second market; for the L-share treatment and the U-share in the no-correlation treatment these p-values are 0.074 
and 0.002, respectively.  All other between-treatment comparisons, as listed in the text, show p-values above 0.480.  
The U-share price trajectories of the no-correlation treatment behave differently than all other price trajectories.  
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markets.51  Given Observation 11, we find no support for Hypothesis 7 in the single-asset 
environment.  The relatively high valuation of the U-share in the no-correlation treatment seems 
to be an artifact of relative valuation.  To see whether this result and also the confirmation of the 
MM theorem is an artifact of the described environment (Smith et al. 1988), we report in the 
following section another presumably-simpler experimental treatment with single-period markets. 
 
Table 7: RD-value in single-asset market experiment (in percent) 
The table records the RD-values for the single-asset sessions.  No significant 
differences from zero per the two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests.  Numbers in 
brackets are z-statistics. 
 
L-share 
treatment 
(n1 = 8) 
U-share 
treatment 
(n2 = 8) 
Mann-Whitney test 
(between treatments), 
p-value [Z-statistic] 
Market 1 
3.57 
[0.42] 
-2.00 
[0.42] 
1.000 
[0.00] 
Market 2 
-6.33 
[-0.42] 
-2.29 
[0.00] 
0.529 
[-0.63] 
Total average 
-1.38 
[-0.14] 
-2.15 
[0.28] 
0.753 
[-0.32] 
 
 
5.B Single-period market experiments 
Our fourth treatment has single-period asset markets involving four repetitions with a 10-fold 
dividend.52 The overall procedures were the same as described above besides the following 
differences.  Subjects were endowed in every period with two L-shares and two U-shares that 
they traded in the double-auction market.  These shares paid one dividend at the end of the 
                                                 
51 We chose to provide this information to the subjects to try to help manage the cognitive burden in this rather 
complex environment.  This may have served to reduce bubbles, but this was not the primary point of the paper. 
52 In total there were 10 periods.  The described assets were traded in periods 1, 4, 7 and 10.  In the other periods, 
assets with the same expected values were traded.  For ease of presentation we skip the discussion of these assets 
here.  However, the analysis of those assets are completely in line with the reported data.  Please see the instructions 
in the Online Appendix for futher details.  Subjects traded in a total of three consecutive markets of 10 periods, one 
involving a single-period treatment and the other two markets involving a single asset treatment.  We found no order 
effects in the data, so we pool the data by treatment. 
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period and then were cancelled.  In the experiment, one period would be selected for payment.  
Possible dividends on an L-share were {0, 80, 280, 600}.  In the perfect-correlation treatment, 
the possible dividends on the U-share were always 240 cash units higher than the dividend on the 
L-share.  In the no-correlation treatment, the dividends of the L-share and the U-share were 
independent; the equally likely dividends per U-share were {240, 320, 520, 840}.   
Including the pilot session, we have nine independent cohorts participating in the perfect 
correlation treatment, and eight independent cohorts for the no-correlation treatment.   
 
Observation 12.  We find significant differences from parity pricing neither in any period 
nor in any single-period asset market treatment.  Between treatments we observe no 
significant differences in any period. 
Support.  Table A4 in the Online Appendix (appended to this paper) records the average 
difference from parity for the repetitions.  The test results show that the difference from price 
parity between assets is not significant in any treatment and period.53  There are no significant 
differences between the two treatments.   
Given Observation 12, on average subjects trade at fundamentals and at parity.  However, 
there are significant deviations from parity within cohorts.  In some cohorts the L-share is valued 
relatively above the U-share; in other cohorts the U-share is valued above the L-share.  Hence, we 
find no support for Hypothesis 7 in the single-period market; the high relative valuation of the U-
share of the no-correlation treatment is not reproduced in this comparatively simple market 
environment.  In line with Observation 8, the shares in the single-period treatment trade closer to 
                                                 
53 For completeness, the average absolute deviations from parity are 14 percent and 12 percent and the deviations 
from fundamentals are 16 and 13 percent for the perfect-correlation treatment and the no-correlation treatment, 
respectively.  The absolute deviations and the deviations from fundamentals do not decline significantly between 
repetitions in either treatment.   
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fundamentals with higher acuity in the market.  In contrast to Observations 1 and 2, there are no 
significant differences between treatments in the single-period treatment.  This result suggests that 
the differences between arbitrage dynamics and equilibrium dynamics cannot easily be detected 
in a simple market setting.  To detect the differences, one may need a rather extreme test like the 
one we have used in the context of bubbles and declining fundamental values (Smith et al 1988). 
 
6. Conclusions 
Our data support the MM invariance theorem in the following way.  As proposed in the arbitrage 
proof of the original paper (Modigliani and Miller 1958), we observe the same average market 
values for shares of perfectly correlated returns.  The data suggest that perfect correlation of 
future returns (where price discrepancies can be arbitraged away without risk) is required to 
obtain the law of one price in our setting.  This necessary condition is recommended through our 
control treatment where perfect correlation is removed.  The deviations from parity pricing and 
the observed pricing discrepancies are significantly larger in the control treatment than in the 
perfect-correlation treatment.  Despite the fact that earlier research reported an insensitivity of 
behavior to changes in return correlations (e.g., Kroll et al.  1988), we do find a significant effect.  
Under no correlation, i.e., with independent multi-period lived assets, we do not obtain the law of 
one price for the same idiosyncratic risks of our single assets.  With limits to arbitrage, the 
market manifests a risk premium.  The (“leveraged”) L-share is less pricey than the (“all equity”) 
U-share.  This could be a spurious effect; our research in this respect is not conclusive.  We 
investigated if this effect may be driven by a behavioral bias in relative valuation similar to the 
certainty effect (Kahneman and Tversky 1986).  The fact that the dividend in the U-share is 
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strictly positive (whereas the L-share dividend can be zero) could possibly bias subjects to push 
up U-share prices when trader acuity is low.  We observe this effect only in the two-asset setting 
of the no-correlation treatment.  The higher market valuation of the U-share compared to the L-
share treatment in the no-correlation treatment is not observed in our single-asset market 
treatments.  For existing limits to arbitrage, our data (in the no-correlation treatment) suggest that 
capital structure may indeed affect the market value of the company.  The finding that value 
invariance holds under perfect correlation but not necessarily with imperfect correlation is a key 
contribution of the paper.  This result is intriguing, as the CAPM suggests the law of one price 
for our zero-correlation setting.  This result along with the result that single-asset markets behave 
differently from multiple-assets markets show that more experimental research is needed to 
uncover the trading dynamics and interactions of multiple multi-period-lived assets.     
Our study does not provide a test of the unrestrained validity of MM invariance, since we 
consider a zero interest rate and non-traded debt.  Nonetheless, we note that we obtain this result 
in the standard setting of Smith et al. (1988), known for producing mispricing among 
inexperienced subjects.  We found that value invariance can also be obtained in simpler settings, 
including those with constant fundamental dividend value.  For the single-period setting our data 
suggest that the law of one price can be obtained on average even if returns are not perfectly 
correlated but only the same in expected terms.  In more complex settings, as suggested in our 
experiments with two multi period lived assets, MM invariance seems to require perfect 
correlation of future return streams.  
Our results also shed light on different levels of market efficiency.  We find support of 
market efficiency for the case of riskless arbitrage.  We also find that market efficiency increases 
with repetition.  Price discrepancies decrease and prices move towards fundamental dividend 
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values with repetition, and we document the existence of equilibrium dynamics when price 
discrepancies arise.  We observe that high overall acuity, as measured by the CRT score, reduces 
price discrepancy in the market.  Deviations from theoretical predictions become smaller when 
we look at markets with overall high trader acuity.  Nonetheless, the deviations are never entirely 
removed.  So for the data from our design, we have the sense that Rietz (2005) is correct when 
he states that without a dedicated arbitrageur taking advantage of any mispricing, the laboratory 
market does not completely eliminate price discrepancies.   
As is frequently observed with market studies, we conclude that the data suggest a 
movement of behavior in the direction of the predictions of financial economic theory, but do not 
provide full quantitative support of the theoretical benchmark.  Hence, as price discrepancies do 
not cease during the experiment our data hint to significant potential gains for arbitrageurs.  In 
the real world, exploitation of price discrepancies requires the arbitrageur to take risk (as has 
been shown in the twin-share LTCM cases, Shleifer 2000).  So in the real world, arbitrageurs 
may require deep pockets and patience to lock in their arbitrage gains. 
 
  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3428299 
 
 
51
References 
 
Abbink, Klaus and Bettina Rockenbach, 2006.  Option pricing by students and professional traders: a 
behavioural investigation, Managerial and Decision Economics 27(6), 497-510. 
Ackert, Lucy F., Narat Charupat, Richard Deaves, and Brian D. Kluger, 2009.  Probability judgment error 
and speculation in laboratory asset market bubbles.  Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 
44(3), 719–744. 
Akiyama, Eizo, Nobuyuki Hanaki, and Ryuichiro Ishikawa, 2013.  It is Not Just Confusion! Strategic 
Uncertainty in an Experimental Asset Market.  Aix Marseilles School of Economics WP 2013 - Nr 40. 
Biais, Bruno, and Pouget, Sébastian  (1999).  Microstructure, incentives and convergence to equilibrium 
in experimental financial markets.  Unpublished working paper, Toulouse University, France.   
Breaban, Adriana and Charles Noussair, 2014.  Fundamental Value Trajectories and Trader Characteristics 
in an Asset Market Experiment.  (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol.  2014-010). Tilburg: Economics. 
Cadsby, Bram C., and Elisabeth Maynes, 1998.  Laboratory Experiments in Corporate and Investment 
Finance: A Survey. Managerial and Decision Economics 19(4/5), Laboratory Methods in Economics, 
277-298. 
Chan, Kenneth S., Vivian Lei, and Filip Vesely, 2013.  Differentiated Assets: An Experimental Study on 
Bubbles.  Economic Inquiry 51(3), 1731–1749. 
Charness, Gary and Uri Gneezy, 2010.  Portfolio choice and risk attitudes: An experiment.  Economic 
Inquiry 48(1), 133-146. 
Cheung, Stephen L., Morten Hedegaard, and Stefan Palan, 2014. To see is to believe: Common 
expectations in experimental asset markets. European Economic Review 66, 84-96.  
Corgnet, Brice, Roberto Hernán-González, Praveen Kujal, and David Porter, 2015.  The Effect of Earned 
vs. House Money on Price Bubble Formation in Experimental Asset Markets.  Review of Finance 
19(4): 1455-1488. 
DeAngelo, Harry, and Linda DeAngelo, 2006.  The irrelevance of the MM dividend irrelevance theorem.  
Journal of Financial Economics 79(2), 293-315. 
Dufwenberg, Martin, Tobias Lindqvist, and Evan Moore, 2005.  Bubbles and Experience: An Experiment.  
American Economic Review, 95(5): 1731-1737. 
Eckel, Catherine C., and Sascha Füllbrunn, 2015.  Thar 'She' blows? Gender, Competition, and Bubbles in 
Experimental Asset Markets.  American Economic Review 105(2), 906-920. 
Fischbacher, Urs, 2007.  z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments.  Experimental 
Economics 10(2), 171-178. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3428299 
 
 
52
Frederick, Shane, 2005.  Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making.  Journal of Economic Perspectives 
19(4), 25-42. 
Froot, Kenneth A., and Emil M.  Dabora, 1999.  How are stock prices affected by the location of trade?.  
Journal of financial economics 53(2), 189-216. 
Greiner, Ben, 2004.  An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments.  In: Forschung und 
wissenschaftliches Rechnen 2003.  GWDG Bericht 63, 79-93. 
Haruvy, Ernan, and Charles N. Noussair, 2006. The effect of short selling on bubbles and crashes in 
experimental spot asset markets. Journal of Finance 61(3), 1119-1157.  
Haruvy, Ernan, Yaron Lahav, Charles Noussair, 2007.  Traders’ Expectations in Asset Markets: 
Experimental Evidence.  American Economic Review 97(5), 1901-1920. 
Judd, Kenneth L. and Sy-Ming Guu, 2001. Asymptotic methods for asset market equilibrium analysis. 
Economic Theory 18, 127–157. 
Kirchler, Michael, Jürgen Huber, Thomas Stöckl, 2012.  Thar she bursts – Reducing confusion reduces 
bubbles.  American Economic Review 102(2), 865-883. 
Kroll, Yoram, Haim Levy and Amnon Rapoport, 1988.  Experimental test of the Separation Theorem and 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model.  American Economic Review 78(3), 500-519. 
Lamont, Owen A., and Richard H.  Thaler, 2003.  Anomalies: The Law of One Price in Financial Markets.  
Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(4), 191-202. 
Lei, Vivian, Charles N.  Noussair, and Charles R.  Plott, 2001.  Nonspeculative bubbles in experimental 
asset markets: Lack of common knowledge of rationality vs. actual irrationality. Econometrica 69(4), 
831-859. 
Levati, M.  Vittoria, Jianying Qiu and Prashanth Mahagaonkar, 2012.  Testing the Modigliani-Miller 
theorem directly in the lab.  Experimental Economics 15(4), 693–716. 
Miller, Merton H., 1988.  The Modigliani-Miller Propositions After Thirty Years.  The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 2(4), 99-120.   
Modigliani, Franco and Merton H.  Miller, 1958.  The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance and the Theory 
of Investment.  American Economic Review 48(3), 261-97.   
Modigliani, Franco and Merton H.  Miller, 1959.  The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance and the Theory 
of Investment: Reply.  American Economic Review 49(4), 655-669. 
Modigliani, Franco and Merton H.  Miller, 1963.  Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A 
Correction.  American Economic Review 53(4), 433-443. 
Noussair, Charles N., and Steven Tucker, 2006.  Futures markets and bubble formation in experimental 
asset markets.  Pacific Economic Review 11(2), 167-184.   
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3428299 
 
 
53
Noussair, Charles N., Steven Tucker, and Yilong Xu, 2016.  Futures markets, cognitive ability, and 
mispricing in experimental asset markets.  Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 130, 166-
179.   
O'Brien, John and Sanjay Srivastava, 1991.  Dynamic Stock Markets with Multiple Assets: An 
Experimental Analysis.  The Journal of Finance 46(5), 1811-1838. 
Oliven, Kenneth and Thomas A.  Rietz, 2004.  Suckers Are Born but Markets Are Made.  Management 
Science 50(3), 336–351. 
Palan, Stefan, 2013.  A Review of Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Asset Markets.  Journal of 
Economic Surveys 27(3), 570-588. 
Porter, David P., and Vernon L.  Smith, 1995.  Futures contracting and dividend uncertainty in 
experimental asset markets.  Journal of Business 68(4), 509-541.   
Rietz, Thomas A., 2005.  Behavioral Mis-pricing and Arbitrage in Experimental Asset Markets.  Working 
Paper, University of Iowa. 
Shleifer, Andrei, 2000.  Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance (Clarendon Lectures 
in Economics), Oxford University Press. 
Shleifer, Andrei and Lawrence H.  Summers, 1990.  The noise trader approach to finance.  Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 4(2), 19-33.   
Smith, Vernon L., Gerry L.  Suchanek and Arlington W.  Williams, 1988.  Bubbles, Crashes, and 
Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets.  Econometrica 56(5), 1119-1151. 
Stiglitz, Joseph, 1969.  A Re-Examination of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem.  American Economic 
Review 59(5), 784-93. 
Stöckl, Thomas, Jürgen Huber, and Michael Kirchler, 2010.  Bubble measures in experimental asset 
markets.  Experimental Economics 13(3), 284-298. 
Sunder, Shyam, 1995.  Experimental Asset Markets.  In: The Handbook of Experimental Economics 
(edited by John Kagel and Al Roth), Princeton University Press, 445-500. 
Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman, 1986. Rational choice and the framing of decisions. Journal of 
Business, S251-S278. 
Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman, 1992. Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of 
uncertainty. Journal of Risk and uncertainty 5(4), 297-323. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3428299 
 
 
54
 
 
Online Appendix 
(see Journal of Finance webpage) 
 
 
Supplement to accompany 
 
“A test of the Modigliani-Miller invariance theorem and arbitrage in 
experimental asset markets” 
 
by 
 
Gary Charness and Tibor Neugebauer 
 
 
 
A Tables A1-A4 
 
B Documentation of data and experimental software  
(downloadable from the webpage of the Journal of Finance) 
 
C Experimental Instructions 
(downloadable from the webpage of the Journal of Finance) 
 
 
  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3428299 
 
 
55
Table A1.  Average median difference from parity  in percent 
The table records the median difference from parity (4) over ten periods and averaged over 
all sessions for each market and both treatment.  The first column records the averages for 
the perfect-correlation treatment and the second column for the no-correlation treatment. 
The bottom line shows the average difference from parity over all periods.  Asterisks 
indicate significant differences from parity measured by the two tailed, one-sample 
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test.  The last column shows the p-value resulting from the two-
tailed, two-sample Mann-Whitney test.  Z-statistics are recorded in brackets.  Significant 
differences are indicated;  ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.   
Treatment 
 
Perfect correlation 
(n = 12) 
No correlation  
(n = 8) 
Mann-Whitney test 
(between treatments),  
p-value, [Z-statistic] 
Market 1 
8.39 
[0.67] 
28.24** 
[2.38] 
0.031** 
[2.16] 
Market 2 
3.37 
[1.10] 
31.26** 
[2.52] 
0.006*** 
[2.77] 
Market 3 
2.54 
[1.10] 
19.03** 
[2.24] 
0.054* 
[1.93] 
Market 4 
0.24 
[0.24] 
13.73** 
[2.52] 
0.064*** 
[2.70] 
Average 
4.41 
[1.49] 
23.30** 
[2.52] 
0.014** 
[2.78] 
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Table A2A: Average median PD-value (in percent) 
The table records the median price discrepancy (5) for the ten market periods averaged 
over all sessions for each market and treatment. The bottom lines show the average 
price discrepancy over all periods, and the one-tailed Page trend test that checks for a 
significant decline in repeated markets.  The last column shows the p-value resulting 
from the two-tailed, two-sample Mann-Whitney test.  Z-statistics are recorded in 
brackets.  Significant differences are indicated;  ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.   
^One-tailed tests. 
 
Perfect 
correlation 
(n1 = 12) 
No 
correlation 
(n2 = 8) 
Mann-Whitney test 
(between treatments), 
p-value, [Z-statistic]^ 
Market 1 22.97 39.78 
0.061* 
[1.54] 
Market 2 12.62 34.13 
0.013** 
[2.16] 
Market 3 13.38 24.06 
0.124 
[0.97] 
Market 4 11.80 20.00 
0.109 
[1.23] 
Total 15.51 29.80 
0.045** 
[1.70] 
p-value (one-tailed 
Page trend test)^ 
0.212 
[-.80] 
0.014** 
[-2.20] 
 
 
 
Table A2B: Average median DF-value (in percent) 
The table records the deviation from fundamentals (6) for the ten market periods 
averaged over all sessions for each market and treatment.  The bottom lines show the 
average deviation from fundamentals over all periods, and the one-tailed Page trend test 
that checks for a significant decline in repeated markets.  The last column shows the p-
value resulting from the two-tailed, two-sample Mann-Whitney test.  Z-statistics are 
recorded in brackets.  Significant differences are indicated;  ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 
0.10.   ^One-tailed tests. 
 
Perfect 
correlation 
(n1 = 12) 
No 
correlation 
(n2 = 8) 
Mann-Whitney test 
(between treatments), 
p-value [Z-statistic] 
Market 1 20.75 38.04 
0.247 
[1.16] 
Market 2 14.77 30.70 
0.037** 
[2.08] 
Market 3 15.01 21.82 
0.396 
[0.85] 
Market 4 14.82 17.41 
0.316 
[1.00] 
Total 15.93 27.05 
0.190 
[1.31] 
p-value (one-tailed 
Page trend test)^ 
.055* 
[-1.60] 
.000*** 
[-3.60] 
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Table A3.  Subject pool composition 
Gender Field of Studies 
Number of 
subjects 
North 
American 
Mexican,  
South  
American 
Asian 
Rest of  
World, not 
revealed° 
Subject Age    
18-32 
Payoff Rank  
1-9 
CRT score  
0-3 
Risk aversion 
%safe invest 
0-100 
Male Economics, financial math, actuarial sciences 29 10 3 7 9 19.9 4.4 1.2 48.8 
 
Physics, electrical/mechanical engin., 
engineering 
7 7    20.0 4.6 1.0 59.6 
 Mathematics, statistics 7 2 1 3 1 21.7 4.6 1.3 57.1 
 Computer science, computer engine. 6 3  2 1 19.0 3.9 1.7 48.3 
 
Bio-/chemistry, chemical eng, pharmacology, 
pre-med 
13 5 2 4 2 20.6 4.7 1.4 60.4 
 
Biology, biopsychology, microbiology, bio 
anthropology, pre-bio, zoology 
15 6 3 3 3 19.3 3.9 1.3 56.2 
 Psychology 1   1  21.0 4.9 2.0 100.0 
 
Global/environmental studies/ earth 
science/geography/ecology, fishery 
management 
7 2 2 2 1 23.9 4.6 0.9 55.7 
 Film and arts, music, communication 4 3  1  21.0 6.7 1.0 47.5 
 Total | Average 89 38 11 23 17 20.4 4.5 1.3 54.3 
Female Economics, financial math, actuarial sciences 20 6 3 9 2 19.6 5.3 0.6 62.6 
 
Physics, electrical/mechanical engin., 
engineering 
6 2  3 1 19.8 5.1 1.0 76.7 
 Mathematics, statistics 7 2  2 3 19.6 5.0 0.3 61.6 
 Computer science, computer engine. 2 1   1 18.5 2.9 1.5 69.5 
 
Bio-/chemistry, chemical eng, pharmacology, 
pre-med 
5 1 2 2  20.6 6.4 0.2 53.0 
 
Biology, biopsychology, microbiology, bio 
anthropology, pre-bio, zoology 
29 11 4 6 8 19.7 6.0 0.7 65.0 
 Psychology 5 2 1 2  20.0 6.4 0.4 73.4 
 
Global/environmental studies/ earth 
science/geography/ecology, fishery 
management 
7 4 1 2  21.3 4.9 0.6 67.9 
 Film and arts, music, communication 2   2  19.0 4.9 2.0 52.5 
 Not revealed° 2    2 19.0 3.9 0.5 97.0 
 Total | Average 85 29 11 28 17 19.8 5.5 0.7 65.6 
 (Female share %) (49%) (43%) (50%) (55%) (50%)     
 Sample Total | Average 174 67 22 51 34 20.1 5.0 1.0 59.8 
° 21 subjects (12%) did not respond to the question of their nationality, two female subjects did not respond to the question of their field of studies 
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Table A4.  Average difference from parity  in percent in the single-period 
asset-market experiment 
Treatment 
 
Perfect correlation 
(n = 9) 
No correlation  
(n = 8) 
Mann-Whitney test 
(between treatments),  
p-value, [Z-statistic] 
Market 1 
-1.53 
[-.30] 
-11.8 
[-1.12] 
0.29 
[-1.06] 
Market 2 
3.49 
[0.42] 
-5.27 
[-.84] 
0.336 
[-.96] 
Market 3 
0.71 
[.12] 
-3.42 
[-.28] 
0.564 
[-.58] 
Market 4 
3.00 
[.42] 
-0.94 
[-.42] 
0.85 
[-.19] 
Average 
1.42 
[.30] 
-5.36 
[-1.05] 
0.413 
[-.82] 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10; significant differences from zero within treatment 
according to two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests.  Numbers in brackets are z-statistics.   
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Appendix B: Documentation of Data and Experimental Software 
(SEE JOURNAL OF FINANCE WEBPAGE OR REQUEST FROM 
AUTHORS) 
 
 
B1. Experimental Software 
The main program for this experiment is included here in the file “Charness 
Neugebauer market.ztt.” 
The program “Warming up quizes.ztt” contains the investment game task for the risk 
aversion elicitation and the CRT for the acuity elicitation. 
The programs “quiz dividend … .ztt” contains comprehension questions on the 
dividend tables. 
The program “quiz forecasting.ztt” contains comprehension questions on the belief 
elicitation task. 
The program “questionnaire.ztq” contains the questionnaire that was used for the 
debriefing of subjects, which includes indications regarding gender, etc. 
To run this program, one would need to obtain the zTree software, which can be 
obtained following the link; http://www.ztree.uzh.ch/en.html   
 
 
 
B2. Five data files (described on the following pages):  
(1) End of Period Market DATA.xls,  
(2) End of Period Subject DATA.xls,  
(3) Double Auction Trading DATA.xls, 
(4) Subject Characteristics DATA.xls,  
(5) Additional treatments EOP Market DATA.xls 
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B2.1 Data File (1): End of Period Market DATA.xls 
This file provides the data of the perfect-correlation treatment and the no-correlation 
treatment (including for tables 2, 3A, 3B and 4). In total there were 20 independent 
cohorts, 2 cohorts in 10 sessions, 4 sessions of the no-correlation treatment 
(140527_0951, 140529_0952, 140606_1501, 140609_1431) and 6 sessions of the 
perfect correlation treatment (140520_1450, 140521_0936, 140521_1418, 
140522_0905, 140530_0948, 140530_1600). The first column (session) indicates the 
Day-Month-Year_Time-of-Inititiation. E.g., 140527_0951 indicates data collected in 
the session that was initiated at 9.51 am on May 27, 2014. In the perfect-correlation 
treatment, four L-share prices from three cohorts are at or above 1000 cash units 
during the last four periods of the fourth market (framed cells in the data file). We 
have excluded the average prices of these periods for these cohorts from figure 2. One 
L-share price is 2000 cash units in the last period of market 4 in cohort 1 of session 
140530_1600. This period was eliminated from all analyses. Owed to a server crash in 
session 140522_0905, the data of the second market include only 9 periods.  
 The following table describes the columns of data file (1) in more detail. 
 
Table B2.1 Detailed description - Data File (1): End of Period Market DATA.xls 
 Column Label Description 
A 1 Session Indicates the session by the date of initiation.  
B 2 Session number Sessions 1..6 for the perfect correlation, 7...10 no-correlation treatment; 
each session involved Group 1 and 2 as two independent cohorts  
C 3 Market Indicates market 1..4 for the four markets of 10 periods 
D 4 Period Indicates period 1..10 for the 10 periods per sequence 
E 5 NumPeriods Number of periods in the sequence 
F 6 Correlation 1 indicates perfect correlation, 0 no correlation treatment 
G 7 Consensus 1 indicates that the median belief is public, 0 private beliefs only 
H 8 InitialCash Cash endowment was 1200 units per period in single period, per sequence 
in single asset treatment, where it was carried over between periods. 
I 9 InitialStockL Endowment of L-shares per period in single period, per sequence in single 
asset treatment, where shares were carried over between periods. 
J 10 InitialStockU Endowment of U-shares per period in single period, per sequence in single 
asset treatment, where shares were carried over between periods. 
K 11 NumContracts Indicates the total number of submitted limit orders in both cohorts 
L 12 NumTradesL Indicates the total number of L-share transactions in both cohort 
M 13 NumTradesU Indicates the total number of U-share transactions in both cohort 
N 14 DIV[1] Indicates the smallest potential dividend in a period. For the single-period 
treatment, only the potential L-share dividend is indicated. 
O 15 DIV[2] Indicates the second smallest potential dividend in a period. For the single-
period treatment, only the potential L-share dividend is indicated. 
P 16 DIV[3] Indicates the second largest potential dividend in a period. For the single-
period treatment, only the potential L-share dividend is indicated. 
Q 17 DIV[4] Indicates the largest potential dividend in a period. For the single-period 
treatment, only the potential L-share dividend is indicated. 
R 18 DividendL The recorded L-share dividend of the period 
S 19 DividendU The recorded U-share dividend of the period 
T 20 TimeAuction The time-length of market opening in seconds  
U 21 OPriceL First recorded L-share transaction (open) price in the period for cohort 1. 
Previous period opening price is recorded in a period without transaction. 
V 22 HPriceL Highest recorded L-share price in the period for cohort 1. Previous period 
high price is recorded in a period without transaction. 
W 23 LPriceL Lowest recorded L-share price in the period for cohort 1. The previous 
period low price is recorded in a period without transaction. 
X 24 MPriceL Recorded average L-share price of the period for cohort 1, in equation (4) 
referred to as SLt. Missing observation in a period without transaction. 
Y 25 CPriceL Last recorded L-share transaction (close) price in the period for cohort 1. 
Previous period closing price is recorded in a period without transaction. 
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 Column Label Description 
Z 26 OPriceU First recorded U-share transaction (open) price in the period for cohort 1. 
Previous period opening price is recorded in a period without transaction. 
AA 27 HPriceU Highest recorded U-share price in the period for cohort 1. Previous period 
high price is recorded in a period without transaction. 
AB 28 LPriceU Lowest recorded U-share price in the period for cohort 1. Previous period 
low price is recorded in a period without transaction. 
AC 29 MPriceU Recorded average U-share price of the period for cohort 1, in equation (4) 
referred to as SUt. Missing observation in a period without transaction. 
AD 30 CPriceU Last recorded U-share transaction (close) price in the period for cohort 1. 
Previous period closing price is recorded in a period without transaction. 
AE 31 OPriceG2L First recorded L-share transaction (open) price in the period for cohort 2. 
Previous period opening price is recorded in a period without transaction. 
AF 32 HPriceG2L Highest recorded L-share price in the period for cohort 2. Previous period 
high price is recorded in a period without transaction. 
AG 33 LPriceG2L Lowest recorded L-share price in the period for cohort 2. Previous period 
low price is recorded in a period without transaction. 
AH 34 CPriceG2L Last recorded L-share transaction (close) price in the period for cohort 2. 
Previous period closing price is recorded in a period without transaction. 
AI 35 MPriceG2L Recorded average L-share price of the period for cohort 2, in equation (4) 
referred to as SLt. Missing observation in a period without transaction. 
AJ 36 OPriceG2U First recorded U-share transaction (open) price in the period for cohort 2. 
Previous period opening price is recorded in a period without transaction. 
AK 37 HPriceG2U Highest recorded U-share price in the period for cohort 2. Previous period 
high price is recorded in a period without transaction. 
AL 38 LPriceG2U Lowest recorded U-share price in the period for cohort 2. Previous period 
low price is recorded in a period without transaction. 
AM 39 MPriceG2U Recorded average U-share price of the period for cohort 2, in equation (4) 
referred to as SUt. Missing observation in a period without transaction. 
AN 40 CPriceG2U Last recorded U-share transaction (close) price in the period for cohort 2. 
Previous period closing price is recorded in a period without transaction. 
AO 41 FLt Expected dividend value during the period of L-share 
AP 42 FUt Expected dividend value during the period of U-share 
AQ 43 Delta Difference from parity pricing, ∆t (equation 4), in the period for cohort 1. 
Where L-share or U-share prices are missing, delta is missing. 
AR 44 DeltaG2 Difference from parity pricing, ∆t (equation 4), in the period for cohort 2. 
Where L-share or U-share prices are missing, delta is missing. 
AS 45 |Delta_t| Absolute difference from parity pricing in the period for cohort 1, |∆t| 
(equation 5). Missing observation in periods without transaction.  
AT 46 |DeltaG2_t| Absolute difference from parity pricing in the period for cohort 2, |∆t| 
(equation 5). Missing observation in periods without transaction. 
AU 47 DFLt Absolute difference of L-share price from fundamentals in the period for 
cohort 1, DFLt (equation 6). Missing observation in a period without 
transaction. 
AV 48 DFG2Lt Abs. difference of L-share price from fundamentals in the period for cohort 
2, DFLt (equation 6). Missing observation in a period w/o transaction. 
AW 49 DFUt Absolute difference of U-share price from fundamentals in the period for 
cohort 1, DFLt (equation 6). Missing observation in a period without 
transaction. 
AX 50 DFG2Ut Absolute difference of U-share price from fundamentals in the period for 
cohort 2, DFLt (equation 6). Missing observation in a period without 
transaction. 
AY 51 (SLt-FLt)/FL Relative deviation of L-share price from fundamentals in the period for 
cohort 1, (SLt - FLt)/ FL (equation 7). Missing observation in a period w/o 
transaction. 
AZ 52 (SLG2t-LG2t)/FL Relative deviation of L-share price from fundamentals in the period for 
cohort 2, (SLt - FLt)/ FL (equation 7). Missing observation in a period w/o 
transaction. 
BA 53 (SUt-FUt)/FU Relative deviation of U-share price from fundamentals in the period for 
cohort 1, (SUt - FUt)/ FU (equation 7). Missing observation in a period w/o 
transaction. 
BB 54 (SUG2t-
FUG2t)/FU 
Relative deviation of U-share price from fundamentals in the period for 
cohort 2, (SUt - FUt)/ FU (equation 7). Missing observation in a period w/o 
transaction. 
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B2.2 Data File (2): End of Period Subject DATA.xls 
This file provides the data of the perfect correlation treatment and the no-correlation 
treatment. This file reveals the subject's purchases and sales during a period, the final 
share and cash holdings. Negative values indicate short positions. In total there were 
174 subjects participating in 20 independent cohorts, 2 cohorts in 10 sessions, 4 
sessions of the no-correlation treatment (see section B2.1 for more details).  
 The following table describes the columns of data file (2) in more detail. 
 
Table B2.2 Detailed description - Data File (2): End of Period Subject DATA.xls 
 Column Label Description 
A 1 Session Indicates the session by the date of initiation.  
B 2 Correlation 1 indicates perfect correlation, 0 no correlation treatment 
C 3 Cohort Sessions 1..6 for the perfect correlation, 7...10 no-correlation treatment; 
each session involved Group 1 and 2 as two independent cohorts 
D 4 Market Indicates market 1..4 for the four markets of 10 periods 
E 5 Period Indicates period 1..10 for the 10 periods per sequence 
F 6 Subject Indicates participant's computer terminal 1..18 in the session 
G 7 Cash Record of the subject's cash balance after dividend payment at the end of 
the period. Negative cash holdings indicate debt. 
H 8 StockL Record of the subject's L-share units held at the end of the period. 
Negative numbers indicate a short position. 
I 9 StockU Record of the subject's U-share units held at the end of the period. 
Negative numbers indicate a short position. 
J 10 NumBuysL Number of L-shares the subject purchased in the period. 
K 11 NumSellsL Number of L-shares the subject sold in the period. 
L 12 NumBuysU Number of U-shares the subject purchased in the period. 
M 13 NumSellsU Number of U-shares the subject sold in the period. 
N 14 dZit Indicates the largest potential dividend in a period. For the single-period 
treatment, only the potential L-share dividend is indicated. 
O 15 ProfitTrader Record of the subject's final cash balance, i.e., gains from trading shares 
and collecting dividends in the 10 periods of the market. Losses are cut 
at -500 CU. 
P 16 ProfitObserver Record of the subject's final earnings from forecasting prices in the 10 
periods of the market. Maximum gains are 600, deviations are punished; 
minimum is 0. 
Q 17 ProfitTraderObserver Total earnings from market participation during a market sequence; sum 
of ProfitTrader and ProfitObserver. One market was chosen for payment 
by the roll of a die. Subjects were rewarded with an envelope containing 
this amount plus show-up fee and gains from warming-up-quizzes like 
CRT. 
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B2.3 Data File (3): Double Auction Trading DATA.xls 
This file provides the trading data for the perfect correlation treatment and the no-
correlation treatment (including for tables 3C and 6). There were 20 independent 
cohorts as described in B2.1, 2 cohorts in 10 sessions. Subjects submitted limit orders 
for one unit; an ask indicates a proposed selling price, a bid indicates a proposed 
buying price. Transactions completed when one subject hit the immediate-buy button 
or the immediate-sell button confirming the best outstanding ask or bid. Only one 
share of asset could be transacted at a time. Each line in this data file corresponds to a 
limit order submitted for one share of asset. When a transaction completed, all 
outstanding bids of the buyer and all outstanding asks of the seller were cancelled (for 
both share classes). The transaction partners sellerID and BuyerID were recorded. 
Cancelled limit orders are indicated in the data file by a -2, and outstanding orders at 
the end of the period by -1. Trading was recorded in two independent tables, one for 
the L-share and one for the U-share. The order-book including the best outstanding 
bids and asks were not recorded, but were computed afterwards by the authors taking 
account of the chronological order of limit orders in the two tables and the recorded 
submission and transaction times.  
 The following table describes the columns of data file (3) in more detail. 
 
Table B2.3 Detailed description - Data File (3): Double Auction Trading DATA.xls 
 Column Label Description 
A 1 Session Indicates the session by the date of initiation.  
B 2 Session number Sessions 1..6 for the perfect correlation, 7...10 no-correlation treatment; 
each session involved two independent cohorts  
C 3 Market Indicates market 1..4 for the four markets of 10 periods 
D 4 Cohort Indicates the independent cohort that interacted in four markets of 10 
periods. Cohorts 1..12 are data of the perfect correlation, 13..20 of the 
no-correlation treatment. 
E 5 Period Indicates period 1..10 for the 10 periods per sequence 
F 6 L 1 indicates submission in L-share market, 0 indicates U-share market 
G 7 FV Dividend value of share in market in the submission period  
H 8 SellerID Subject ID 1...18 of the seller / submitter of an offer to sell the share. If 
negative, there is no seller; -1 indicates the limit order remains open 
until the end; -2 indicates the limit order is closed automatically amid a 
purchase / transaction of the limit order submitter. 
I 9 BuyerID Subject ID 1...18 of the buyer / submitter of a bid to purchase the share. 
If negative, there is no buyer; -1 indicates the limit order remains open 
until the end; -2 indicates the limit order is closed automatically amid a 
sale / transaction of the limit order submitter. 
J 10 MakerID Subject ID 1...18 of the submitter of the limit order 
K 11 Bid Recorded bidding (limit) price - price in cash units offered to buy the 
share  
L 12 Ask Recorded asking (limit) price - price in cash units requested to sell the 
share  
M 13 #ask Number of asks outstanding in same cohort / market / share at the time 
of asking order submission 
N 14 #bid Number of asks outstanding in same cohort / market / share at the time 
of bidding order submission 
O 15 LOL_ID L-Share limit order identifier assigned in chronological order; 1 
indicates first limit order, 2 indicates the second, ... the highest number 
indicates the total number of limit orders recorded in the period for the 
L-share (for both cohorts) 
P 16 LOU_ID U-Share limit order identifier assigned in chronological order; 1 
indicates first limit order, 2 indicates the second, ... the highest number 
indicates the total number of limit orders recorded in the period for the 
U-share (for both cohorts)  
Q 17 TPrice Recorded transaction price; if the limit order is accepted via immediate 
buy/sell, the transaction is recorded at the bidding or asking price of the 
limit order. 
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 Column Label Description 
R 18 TL_ID L-share transaction contract identifier assigned in chronological order; 1 
indicates the first transaction, 2 the second one, ... the highest number 
indicates the number of L-share transactions in the period (for both 
cohorts). Missing observation w/o transaction. 
S 19 TU_ID U-share transaction contract identifier assigned in chronological order; 
1 indicates the first transaction, 2 the second one, ... the highest number 
indicates the number of U-share transactions in the period (for both 
cohorts). Missing observation w/o transaction. 
T 20 SubmTime Recorded time of limit order submission in (remaining) seconds before 
market close.  
U 21 TTime Recorded time of transaction in (remaining) seconds before market 
close. 
V 22 CTime Computed time of closing the outstanding limit order. 
W 23 BBidL Computed best L-share bid outstanding in cohort at time of limit order 
submission.  
X 24 BAskL Computed best L-share ask outstanding in cohort at time of limit order 
submission.  
Y 25 BBidU Computed best U-share bid outstanding in cohort at time of limit order 
submission.  
Z 26 BAskU Computed best U-share ask outstanding in cohort at time of limit order 
submission.  
AA 27 SameAsset 
ArbitrageOpp 
Computed dummy that takes value 1 if an arbitrage opportunities within 
the same asset exist, that is, when the best bid exceeds the best ask; 0 
otherwise.   
AB 28 DiscLMU Computed size of cross asset discrepancy, L minus U; exploitable 
(expected) gain by going long the L-share at the best ask and short the 
U-share at the best bid 
AC 29 DiscUML Computed size of cross asset discrepancy, U minus L; exploitable 
(expected) gain by going long the U-share at the best ask and short the 
L-share at the best bid 
AD 30 DiscDummy Computed dummy of outstanding discrepant limit order that takes value 
1 if DLO exists, 0 otherwise  
AE 31 DiscInitiation Computed dummy of discrepant limit order initiation (relevant for 
measure of equation 8) that takes value 1 if DLO is initiated, 0 
otherwise 
AF 32 DiscSizeInit Size of discrepant limit order at initiation; DiscLMU or DiscUML at 
initiation 
AG 33 DiscMaker Computed subject ID of DLO submitter (relevant for measure of 
equation 8) 
AH 33 TakerID Computed subject ID of DLO (relevant for measure of equation 8) 
AI 33 HighExpReturnShare 
ClosesFirstDummy 
Computed dummy that takes value 1 if the high expected return trade 
closes first when a discrepant limit order is initiated (hypothesis 5A); 0 
otherwise. 
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B2.4 Data File (4): Subject Characteristics DATA.xls 
This file provides the data of the subject characteristics by subject and averages by 
cohort for the perfect correlation treatment and the no-correlation treatment (including 
for tables 5A/B). There were 20 independent cohorts, 2 cohorts in 10 sessions, 6 
sessions of the perfect correlation treatment (140520_1450, 140521_0936, 
140521_1418, 140522_0905, 140530_0948, 140530_1600; names indicate initiation 
time (see B2.1)) and 4 sessions of the no-correlation treatment (140527_0951, 
140529_0952, 140606_1501, 140609_1431).  
 The following table describes the columns of data file (4) in more detail. 
 
Table B2.4 Detailed description - Data File (4): Subject Characteristics DATA.xls 
 Column Label Description 
Recorded characteristics of each subject 
A 1 Session Indicates the session by the date of initiation. 
B 2 Cohort There were two independent cohorts per session. Cohorts 1..12 
participated in the perfect correlation, cohorts 13...20 in the no-
correlation treatment 
C 3 Subject ID of the participant in a session. Each session was designed for 18 
subjects (9 per cohort). Three cohorts had 7 subjects. 
D 4 AvgPayoff Average trading gains of the subject in the four market sequences 
E 5 CRT-score Measure of acuity which indicates the subject's number of correct 
answers {0, 1, 2, 3} in the Cognitive Reflection Task. 
F 6 FEMALE Is the self-reported gender dummy; it takes 1 for female, 0 for male 
subjects 
G 7 RiskAversion Measure of risk aversion elicited through the investment game task; it is 
the number {0, 1, ... , 100} of tokens the subject invested in the safe 
asset. 
H 8 AGE 
Self-reported measure of participant's age on the day of the experiment. 
I 9 THEO Self-reported measure of religiousness {0 secularist, 1 moderately 
religious, 2 devout religious}. 
J 10 DLO Indicates the number of discrepant limit orders submitted by the subject 
K 11 RFDLO_i Measure (equation 8) subject's rel frequency of DLO submission 
L 12 APTITUDE Measure (1-RFDLO_i) 
M 13 Nationality Indicates the self-reported origin of the subject 
N 14 Studies Indicates the self-reported department/field of studies 
Average characteristics of each cohort 
O 15 sessionID Indicates the session by the date of the session.  
P 16 cohortID The data involve 20 independent cohorts. Cohorts 1..12 participated in 
the perfect correlation treatment, cohorts 13...20 in the no-correlation 
treatment 
Q 17 treatmentID Identifies treatment; 0 no-correlation, 1 perfect correlation treatment  
R 18 CRT-share Average CRT-score in cohort 
S 19 CRTxTreatDummy CRT-share x treatmentID 
T 20 FemShare Average share of females in cohort  
U 21 AvgRiskAversion Average measure of risk aversion (number of tokens in safe asset) in 
cohort  
V 22 AvgAGE Average reported age in cohort 
W 23 DiffParity Measure (equation 4) - deviation from parity pricing 
X 24 DF Measure (equation 6) - relative absolute deviation from fundamentals 
Y 25 PD Measure (equation 5) - cross-asset price discrepancy 
Z 26 SumLO Total limit orders submitted in cohort 
AA 27 SumDLO Total discrepant limit orders submitted in cohort 
AB 28 RFDLO Measure (equation 8) relative frequency of discrepant limit order 
submission  
AC 29 RD_L-Share Measure (equation 7) relative deviation for L-share 
AD 30 RD_U-share Measure (equation 7) relative deviation for U-share 
AE 31 RD_U-RD_L RD difference between U-share and L-share 
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B2.5 Data File (5): Additional treatments EOP Market DATA.xls 
This file provides the data of the single-asset and the single-period treatments. In total 
there were 12 sessions; 161114_1454, 161115_0934, 161115_1507, 161116_1011, 
161116_1658, 161117_0900, 161117_1435, 161118_0900, 170117_1457, 170118_ 
0802, 170118_1443, 170119_1055. The session id indicates 
DayMonthYear_TimeOfInitiation, e.g., 161114_1454 indicates data collected in the 
session that was initiated at 2.54 pm on the 14th of November, 2016. In sessions (2), 
(3), (7), (8) there was a software bug (the dividend on the U-share was the maximum 
possible dividend always), resulting in invalid data. Data file (5) contains the valid 
data only. Server problems occurred in sessions 161114_1454 (implying a loss of data 
for the single asset treatment in period 10 of the second sequence), 170118_1443 
(requiring a restart of the single period treatment after five periods), 170119_1055 
(requiring a restart of the single period treatment after six periods).  
 The following table describes the columns of data file (5) in more detail. 
 
Table B2.5 Detailed description - Data File (5): Additional treatments EOP DATA.xls 
 Column Label Description 
A 1 Session Indicates the session by the date of the session.  
B 2 Run ID 1..3 for three market sequences of 10 periods, including one 
sequence of the single-period market, two sequences of the single-
asset market 
C 3 Period ID 1..10 for the 10 periods per sequence 
D 4 NumPeriods Number of periods in the sequence 
E 5 Correlation 1 indicates perfect correlation, 0 no correlation treatment 
F 6 SinglePeriodTreatment 1 indicates single period, 0 single asset treatment 
G 7 SingleAssetTreatment 1 indicates L-share, 2 U-share treatment, 0 single period treatment 
H 8 InitialCash Cash endowment was 1200 units per period in single period, per 
sequence in single asset treatment, where it was carried over 
between periods. 
I 9 InitialStockL Endowment of L-shares per period in single period, per sequence in 
single asset treatment, where shares were carried over between 
periods. 
J 10 InitialStockU Endowment of U-shares per period in single period, per sequence 
in single asset treatment, where shares were carried over between 
periods. 
K 11 numContracts Indicates the total number of submitted limit orders in both cohorts 
L 12 numTradesG2L Indicates the number of L-share transactions in cohort 2 
M 13 numTradesG2U Indicates the number of U-share transactions in cohort 2 
N 14 numTradesL Indicates the number of L-share transactions in cohort 1 
O 15 numTradesU Indicates the number of U-share transactions in cohort 1 
P 16 DIV[1] Indicates the smallest potential dividend in a period. For the single-
period treatment, only the potential L-share dividend is indicated. 
Q 17 DIV[2] Indicates the second smallest potential dividend in a period. For the 
single-period treatment, only the potential L-share dividend is 
indicated. 
R 18 DIV[3] Indicates the second largest potential dividend in a period. For the 
single-period treatment, only the potential L-share dividend is 
indicated. 
S 19 DIV[4] Indicates the largest potential dividend in a period. For the single-
period treatment, only the potential L-share dividend is indicated. 
T 20 DividendL The recorded L-share dividend of the period 
U 21 DividendU The recorded U-share dividend of the period 
V 22 TimeAuction The time-length of market opening in seconds  
W 23 OPriceL First recorded L-share transaction (open) price in the period for 
cohort 1 
X 24 HPriceL Highest recorded L-share price in the period for cohort 1 
Y 25 LPriceL Lowest recorded L-share price in the period for cohort 1 
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 Column Label Description 
Z 26 MPriceL Recorded average L-share price of the period for cohort 1, in 
equation (4) referred to as SLt. Missing observation in a period 
without transaction. 
AA 27 CPriceL Last recorded L-share transaction (close) price in the period for 
cohort 1 
AB 28 OPriceU First recorded U-share transaction (open) price in the period for 
cohort 1 
AC 29 HPriceU Highest recorded U-share price in the period for cohort 1 
AD 30 LPriceU Lowest recorded U-share price in the period for cohort 1 
AE 31 MPriceU Recorded average U-share price of the period for cohort 1, in 
equation (4) referred to as SUt. Missing observation in a period 
without transaction. 
AF 32 CPriceU Last recorded U-share transaction (close) price in the period for 
cohort 1 
AG 33 OPriceG2L First recorded L-share transaction (open) price in the period for 
cohort 2 
AH 34 HPriceG2L Highest recorded L-share price in the period for cohort 2 
AI 35 LPriceG2L Lowest recorded L-share price in the period for cohort 2 
AJ 36 CPriceG2L Last recorded L-share transaction (close) price in the period for 
cohort 2 
AK 37 MPriceG2L Recorded average L-share price of the period for cohort 2, in 
equation (4) referred to as SLt. Missing observation in a period 
without transaction. 
AL 38 OPriceG2U First recorded U-share transaction (open) price in the period for 
cohort 2 
AM 39 HPriceG2U Highest recorded U-share price in the period for cohort 2 
AN 40 LPriceG2U Lowest recorded U-share price in the period for cohort 2 
AO 41 MPriceG2U Recorded average U-share price of the period for cohort 2, in 
equation (4) referred to as SUt 
AP 42 CPriceG2U Last recorded U-share transaction (close) price in the period for 
cohort 2 
AQ 43 FLt Expected dividend value during the period of L-share 
AR 44 FUt Expected dividend value during the period of U-share 
AS 45 Delta Difference from parity pricing (equation 4) in cohort 1 
AT 46 DeltaG2 Difference from parity pricing (equation 4) in cohort 2 
AU 47 (SLt-FLt)/FL Relative deviation of L-share price from fundamentals in the period 
for cohort 1, (SLt - FLt)/ FL (equation 7). Missing observation in a 
period w/o transaction. 
AV 48 (SLG2t-LG2t)/FL Relative deviation of L-share price from fundamentals in the period 
for cohort 2, (SLt - FLt)/ FL (equation 7). Missing observation in a 
period w/o transaction. 
AW 49 (SUt-FUt)/FU Relative deviation of U-share price from fundamentals in the period 
for cohort 1, (SUt - FUt)/ FU (equation 7). Missing observation in a 
period w/o transaction. 
AX 50 (SUG2t-FUG2t)/FU Relative deviation of U-share price from fundamentals in the period 
for cohort 2, (SUt - FUt)/ FU (equation 7). Missing observation in a 
period w/o transaction. 
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Appendix C: Experimental Instructions (SEE JOURNAL OF 
FINANCE WEBPAGE OR REQUEST FROM AUTHORS) 
 
 
Experimental Instructions (main experiment) 
• Perfect-correlation treatment 
• No-correlation treatment 
 
First part of the experiment (additional experiments) 
• Perfect-correlation Single-period, first market round 
• No-correlation Single-period, first market round 
• Single-asset expected dividend 24, first 2 market rounds 
• Single-asset expected dividend 48, first 2 market rounds 
 
Further instructions (additional experiments) 
• Further Instructions (perfect-correlation single-period) 
• Further Instructions (no-correlation single-period) 
• Further Instructions single-asset expected dividend 24, market 
rounds 2, 3 
Further Instructions single-asset expected dividend 48, market rounds 2, 3 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3428299 
